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ABSTRACT
Jain, Chinmay. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2012. Essays on short
selling regulations. Major Professors: Pankaj K. Jain, Ph.D. and Thomas H. McInish,
Ph.D.
There are four essays in this dissertation. The first essay provides a detailed
historical account of the evolution of short selling regulations and trading practices
during both normal and crises periods. The second essay focuses on short selling Rule
201. We are unable to document any clear benefits of SEC Rule 201 in ensuring fair
valuations and price stability, promoting higher liquidity and execution quality, or
preventing a sudden flash crash or prolonged market crises. In the third essay, we
examine various short selling regulatory frameworks ranging from total bans on the one
extreme to unrestricted free play on the other, with partly restrictive regimes (e.g. an
uptick rule or the current quote based rule) in the middle. We conclude that a rule that
takes into account a stock’s previous day’s closing price and applies to stocks with high
level of short interest is more effective than the current regulation in balancing the price
efficiency benefits of short selling with its panic mongering effects. In the fourth essay,
we examine after-hours short-selling following quarterly earnings announcements that
are released outside of the normal trading hours. We find that short sellers who trade
after-hours earn a profit of 2.03% when an earnings announcement with negative surprise
occurs after the close of the market. We also find that the magnitude of weighted price
contribution during after-hours period increases with the increase in magnitude of afterhours short selling.
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PREFACE
Chapter 2 of this dissertation has been published in the Handbook of Short Selling and
Chapter 3 of this dissertation has been published at Financial Review journal.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There are four essays in this dissertation. First essay provides the history of short
selling regulations. The second essay analyzes the effect of new short selling Rule 201.
The third essay compares the alternative rule and suggests a better short selling rule. The
fourth essay examines the short selling during after hours.
In the first essay, we provide a detailed historical account of the evolution of short
selling regulations and trading practices during both normal and crises periods. Certain
aspects of short selling restrictions, such as uptick rule and limitations on short selling by
mutual funds, hamper the price discovery process. In contrast, the Regulation SHO curb
on naked short sales and the recent short selling ban on a subset of financial stocks did
not diminish the overall market-wide price discovery process. The level of outstanding
short positions was very high just before the recent financial crisis. SEC’s response in
form of bans and stricter restrictions against naked short selling were quite effective in
reducing both short selling and delivery failures. We also test Miller (1977) hypothesis by
comparing abnormal returns surrounding short selling rule change for groups of stocks
with different levels of divergence of opinion. We find that the stocks that had higher
dispersion of opinion show more positive abnormal returns after the short sale ban than
those with lower dispersion of opinion and no ban.
In the second essay, we analyze the effect of new short selling Rule 201. Despite
its sizable compliance costs, we are unable to document any clear benefits of SEC Rule
201 in ensuring fair valuations and price stability, promoting higher liquidity and
execution quality, or preventing a sudden flash crash or prolonged market crises. Our
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daily and intraday analysis of data both before and after Rule 201 finds that short sellers
are naturally more active before the occurrence of negative returns, not after significant
price declines. Our simulation results show that Rule 201 further curtails short selling
during normal periods, but is not binding on short sellers during the volatile period of the
2008 financial crisis.
In the third essay, we examine various short selling regulatory frameworks
ranging from total bans on the one extreme to unrestricted free play on the other, with
partly restrictive regimes (e.g. an uptick rule or the current quote based rule) in the
middle. We assess how short selling activity varies with regulation for all stocks as well
as rapidly declining stocks during bull, bear, and normal markets. Short sellers actually
tend to withdraw from the markets after extreme price decline irrespective of the
regulations, but the execution rate for simulated short selling orders during the bull and
bear period varies with regulation. We conclude that a rule that takes into account a
stock’s previous day’s closing price and applies to stocks with high level of short interest
is more effective than the current regulation in balancing the price efficiency benefits of
short selling with its panic mongering effects.
In the fourth essay, we examine after-hours short-selling following quarterly
earnings announcements that are released outside of the normal trading hours. We find
that short sellers who trade after-hours on earnings announcement days earn a return of
0.32% by the open of the market. The magnitude of these profits increases to 2.03%
when an earnings announcement with negative surprise occurs after the close of the
market. Next, we find that the magnitude of weighted price contribution during afterhours period increases with the increase in magnitude of after-hours short selling.
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Chapter 2
The evolution of short selling regulations and trading practices
1.

Introduction
Short selling enables a trader to borrow and sell a stock today without actually

owning it. To close a short position, the trader must buy back the stock in the future and
realize the gains or losses based on the difference between selling price and buying price.
Whether or not short selling is a desirable market feature is a question that has always
generated controversy. Proponents of short selling cite several benefits. Short sellers
contribute to efficient pricing in stock markets by allowing negative information to be
easily incorporated in prices as traders can sell an overvalued stock even when they do
not own it. In the absence of short selling, at least some traders with negative opinion
about overvalued stocks are unable to act on that information. As a result, optimistic
investor can push stock prices above fundamental values in markets where short selling is
not allowed. Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007) propose that negative public information
can be incorporated faster in the presence of short sellers and provide empirical evidence
to that effect, in recent periods. Short sellers are viewed as sophisticated traders who can
align a stock’s price with its fundamental value. For example, by rigorously analyzing
accounting information, short sellers can overcome the inertia of existing shareholders
who may continue to hold a stock due to endowment effects and other behavioral
reasons. Therefore, one can expect to see speedier and more immediate price adjustment
instead of a prolonged drift in prices after negative news such as announcements of poor
earnings. Short sellers also provide very substantial additional liquidity in the stock
markets. In the year 2005, short sales represented 31 percent of share volume for
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NASDAQ-listed stocks and 24 percent of share volume for NYSE-listed stocks (Diether,
Lee and Werner, 2009). Another benefit of short selling is that it makes index arbitrage
possible and helps in linking derivatives and cash markets.
Critics of short selling argue that short sellers may hammer a stock’s price below
its fundamental value by engaging in predatory short selling practices. Bear raids were
common in the early 1900s. In a bear raid, short sellers identify a target stock in which
long investors have already fully utilized their margin accounts. Then they aggressively
short the stock. The stock price declines due to the short sales and potentially unauthentic
rumors spread by the bear raiders. This price decline triggers a margin call for long
investors, causing some of them to sell as well, resulting in a further decline in stock
prices. The NYSE prohibited short selling on downticks in 1931 and the SEC introduced
an uptick rule later in 1938, to prevent such bear raids. The uptick rule specifies that a
stock can only be shorted at a transaction price that is at least one tick higher than the
price of the most recent trade with a different price. Over time, regulators have often
imposed restrictions on short selling in reaction to steep declines in stock prices.
Recently, the SEC and the U.K. Financial Services Authority placed restrictions on short
selling after the financial crisis in 2008 and their action was followed by regulators in
countries such as Australia, France, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland and Canada, among
others.
In this chapter, we briefly discuss the literature dealing with changes in short
selling regulations. We provide historical background for short selling regulations in the
U.S. since the 19th century. We also measure price discovery around these regulatory
changes and test whether short selling contributes to a more efficient price discovery,
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taking a long-term perspective. Next, we focus on the short selling rules in place at the
time of major crises in U.S. stock market. We also take a microscopic look at short
selling around the recent financial crisis by using several datasets containing information
about outstanding short interest, fails to deliver, and returns.
2. Literature Review
Several studies have examined the impact of short selling regulations on the stock
market using short horizon event studies around rule changes. Jones (2008) examines
several discrete changes in short selling regulations that made shorting more difficult
during the 1930’s. He finds that the average return associated with these events is
positive. He also finds that the rule requiring all brokers to obtain written authorization
from customers before lending their shares caused a decline in market liquidity. In
contrast, short sale restrictions on downticks in 1931 and the uptick rule in 1938 caused
an increase in liquidity. Alexander and Peterson (1999) show that the execution quality of
short-sell orders is adversely affected by the uptick rule, even when stocks are trading in
advancing markets. Thus, the uptick rule hinders the price discovery process in all states
of the market. Diether, Werner, and Lee (2009) study the effect of the temporary
removal of short sale price tests on designated pilot stocks under Regulation SHO. They
find that the short sales relative to share volume increased for pilot stocks relative to
control stocks and suspension of the price tests makes short selling easier. They do not
find evidence of changes in daily returns or daily volatility of the pilot stocks. They argue
that the effect of the price tests on market quality can be attributed to the distortions in
order flow created by the price tests themselves. Therefore, they conclude that the price
tests can be safely removed. Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2009) study the impact of the
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short selling ban for 797 financial firms in 2008 on their market quality. They find that
the ban caused degradation in their market quality as measured by spreads, price impact,
and intraday price volatility. Their findings suggest that the boost in prices of the banned
securities may have been due to the TARP program, which was announced at the same
time and not necessarily due to the ban on short selling. Kolasinksi, Reed and Thornock
(2009) confirm the findings about degradation in market quality and also find that the
SEC’s June 2008 emergency order to ban naked short selling in 19 financial firms had a
similar effect on market quality. Beber and Pagano (2010) examine this issue in an
international context and find similar results about the ban’s effect on market quality.
They find that imposing bans or regulatory constraints on short selling diminishes market
liquidity, especially for stocks with small market capitalization, high volatility, and no
listed options. They also find that the bans slow the price discovery process and fail to
support stock prices, except possibly for U.S. financial stocks. Aromi and Caglio (2008)
study short selling during the 13-day period preceding the short selling ban on September
19th 2008. They find that on average, the short sale volume is higher for positive return
periods compared to negative return periods. They also find the average price
aggressiveness of sellers who own the stock to be higher than the price aggressiveness of
short sellers. We complement this literature in two ways. First, we provide a broad
historic perspective of short selling rules and their impact on the price discovery process.
Second, we conduct a microscopic analysis of several aspects of short selling activity
surrounding recent regulatory changes.
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3. Historical background on short selling
Perhaps one of the first formal regulations against short selling was enacted in
January 1610 after a group of Dutch businessmen indulged in short selling of East India
company stock. In 1733, naked short selling was banned in Britain after the market
collapse following the South Sea Bubble of 1720. In the U.S., the practice of short selling
was banned in 1812 by New York State. The ban remained in place until 1858, when it
was repealed. Reacting to a decline in stock markets, the NYSE imposed special short
selling regulations during World War I in November 1917. The NYSE required all
brokers to provide a list of speculators every day by noon and threatened to disclose their
identity in case of unusual price behavior. Following the Wall Street crash of 1929, many
new laws were passed to restrict short selling. On October 6, 1931, the NYSE prohibited
short selling at a price lower than the previous sale price. On February 18, 1932, the
NYSE announced that all brokers were required to obtain explicit written authorization
from their customers before lending their shares. A short-short rule was introduced in the
taxpayer act of 1936 to discourage active trading and short selling by mutual funds. The
rule required mutual funds to derive less than 30% of their gross income from the gains
on positions held for less than 3 months or from short sales. After a steep market decline
in 1937, the SEC adopted an uptick rule in 1938. The Investment Company Act of 1940
placed severe restrictions on the mutual funds’ ability to short. This law was lifted in
1997. In the same year, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 repealed the ‘short-short’ rule.
The market timing ability of mutual funds increased significantly after the repeal of this
rule (Bae and Yi, 2008).
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In January 2005, Regulation SHO established "locate" and "close-out"
requirements for broker-dealers, in an effort to curb naked short selling. The locate rule
requires a broker-dealer to have reasonable grounds to believe that the security is
available for borrowing and delivery on the settlement due date before initiating and
executing a short sale. The close-out requirement imposed additional restriction for short
sales in securities where there has been substantial number of delivery failures at a
registered clearing agency. For instance, with limited exception, Regulation SHO
requires brokers and dealers participating in registered clearing agency to take action to
"close-out" failure-to-deliver positions (open fails) in threshold securities that have
persisted for 13 consecutive settlement days. Closing out requires the broker or dealer to
purchase securities of like kind and quantity. Until the position is closed out, the broker
or dealer and any broker or dealer for which it clears transactions (for example, an
introducing broker) may not effect further short sales in that threshold security without
borrowing or entering into a bona fide agreement to borrow the security (known as the
pre-borrowing requirement).
These changes were followed by a period of market strength and rapid trading
that allowed for some relaxation of short selling restriction. Under Regulation SHO pilot
program, 1,000 stocks started trading without short sale price tests (i.e., without an uptick
test for the NYSE and bid price test for the NASDAQ) beginning May 2, 2005. The
suspension of price tests was originally set to expire on April 28, 2006, but was extended
to August 6, 2007. The SEC concluded from the pilot program that price tests modestly
reduce liquidity and do not appear necessary to prevent manipulation. The SEC removed
the uptick rule in July 2007.
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There was a 180 degree reversal in this policy within a year’s time. In response to
the financial crisis, the SEC issued a temporary emergency rule to stop naked short
selling in 19 major financial firms on July 15, 2008. The rule required any person making
a short sale in the listed securities to borrow the securities before the short sale is initiated
and deliver the securities on the settlement date. On September 17, 2008, the SEC added
a new temporary rule 204T to Regulation SHO. The temporary rule imposes a penalty on
any participant of a registered clearing agency, and any broker-dealer from which it
receives trades for clearance and settlement, for having a fail to deliver position at a
registered clearing agency in any equity security. The SEC also repealed the exception
for options market makers from short selling close out provisions in Regulation SHO.
Another rule called the “naked short selling anti-fraud rule” became effective the same
day. It covers short sellers who deceive broker-dealers or any other market participants
about their intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement. After normal
trading closed on that day, the SEC initiated a ban on short selling for 797 financial
stocks. The short selling ban expired on October 8, 2008. On February 24, 2010, the SEC
adopted a new rule to put restrictions on short selling when a stock is experiencing
significant downward price pressure. This alternative form of the uptick rule restricts
short selling from driving down the price of a stock when the stock has already declined
more than 10 percent in one day. This rule will put the long sellers in front of the line and
will enable them to sell shares before the short sellers.
In Table 1, we list the major changes in short selling regulations and changes in
price discovery around those changes. We follow Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007) to
compute our price discovery measure. We compute cross- autocorrelation between
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lagged value-weighted market return and contemporaneous individual stocks returns for
the day. In particular, we calculate ρiT = corr(rit, rmt-1) for all NYSE-listed stocks using
daily observations for each period T. We then average the cross-autocorrelation across N
sample stocks to calculate the measure of price discovery. We compute crossautocorrelation separately for the periods one year after (ρA) and one year before (ρB)
each regulation change and report the difference between the two:

ρ =

∑ (, )

,

ρ =

∑ (, )

,

ρ∆ = ρ − ρ

(1)

Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007) use weekly returns, whereas we use both daily
returns and weekly returns. Since the results are similar, we report results based on daily
returns. Daily returns capture the effect of events which are very close to each other. We
compute cross- autocorrelation between lagged value-weighted market return and
contemporaneous individual stocks returns for the day.

Table 1. Efficiency of price discovery around short selling regulation changes
We list the major short selling regulation changes and the associated dates in columns
1 and 2. We calculate price discovery by computing the average of cross-autocorrelation
between lagged value-weighted market return contemporaneous individual stocks returns
for the day. A higher cross-autocorrelation implies slower price discovery. We provide
the expected change in the cross-autocorrelation in column 3. We report the actual
change in column 4 based on the difference between the cross-autocorrelation 1 year
before and 1 year after the event. For the last 4 events, we calculate the change as the
difference between the cross-autocorrelation 1 month before (or from the date of previous
change in regulation) and 1 month after (or till the date of next change in regulation) the
event.
Date
Rule Change
Expected
Actual
change in
change in
crosscross-autocorrelation
autocorrelation
10/06/1931 NYSE prohibited short sales on a downtick
+
+0.0133
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Table 1–continued
Date

Rule Change

Expected
change in
cross-autocorrelation

06/22/1936 Short-short rule was introduced in the Tax
Payer Act
02/01/1938 The NYSE's tick test was tightened to
require all short sales to take place on a
strict uptick and was extended to all
exchanges
08/22/1940 Investment Act of 1940 restricting short
selling by mutual funds
08/05/1997 Short-short rule was repealed
01/03/2005 Reg SHO established "locate" and "closeout" requirements for broker-dealers, in an
effort to curb naked short selling
07/03/2007 Uptick rule was removed by the SEC
07/21/2008 The emergency rule to stop naked shortselling in 19 major
financial firms becomes effective.
08/12/2008 The emergency rule expires.
09/17/2008 After normal trading closed, the SEC
initiated a ban on short selling for 797
stocks effective. The SEC issued a new and
temporary rule 204T, which imposes a
penalty on any participant of a registered
clearing agency, and any broker-dealer
from which it receives trades for clearance
and settlement, for having a fails to deliver
position at a registered clearing agency in
any equity security. The SEC also
eliminated the options market maker
exception from Regulation SHO’s closeout.
10/08/2008 Following the 10/03/08 announcement, the
short selling ban expires
02/24/2010 Effective from May 2010, the SEC
approved alternative uptick rule (Rule 201)
designed to restrict short selling from
further driving down the price of a stock
that has dropped more than 10 percent in
one day. The compliance date for Rule 201
was February 28, 2011.
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+

Actual
change in
crossautocorrelation
+0.0182

+

-0.0094

+

-0.0134

+

+0.001
-0.0325

+

-0.0975
-0.0312

+

-0.0242
+0.0967

-

-0.0700

+

+0.0196

For events that occurred very close to each other, we use the period of one month
before (or from the date of previous change in regulation) and one month after (or till the
date of next change in regulation) instead of one year. A higher cross-autocorrelation
signifies slower price discovery. The third column in Table 1 shows the theoretically
expected change in the sign of cross-autocorrelation for each regulation change. The last
column shows the actually observed empirical change in the autocorrelation.
The long horizon empirical results indicate that the predicted relation between
short selling rules and price discovery holds true in the univariate analysis only for some
sample periods. Nevertheless, we formally test this relation in the multivariate regression
framework where we control for other potential determinants of price discovery. We
compute yearly time-series of average cross-autocorrelation across stocks from 1926 to
2009. In Table 2, Panel A, we report the results of the regression estimation for crossautocorrelation. Specifically, we look at the effect of tick restrictions, the Investment Act
of 1940, Regulation-SHO, and short sale ban on financial stocks during the financial
crisis in 2008, on cross-autocorrelation. We find that the speed of price discovery as
measured by cross-autocorrelation is significantly related to these short selling rule
changes. Some aspects of short selling regulations such as the tick restrictions and the
Investment Act of 1940 hampered the price discovery process as evidenced by increased
auto-correlations. In contrast other aspects of short selling such as those in the curb on
naked short selling by Regulation-SHO and ban on a subset of stocks during 2008 do not
appear to diminish the overall price discovery process, since autocorrelations do not
increase.

12

We define variables for short selling regulation changes as follows. Tick
restrictions take the following values; 0.5 from 1931 to 1937 when downtick restriction
was in place; 1 from 1938 to 2006 when uptick restriction was in place; and 0 for the
remaining period. Investment Act of 1940 equals 1 for a period from 1940 to 1997, and 0
otherwise. Regulation SHO equals 1 for a period from 2005 to 2009, and 0 before. Ban
on a subset of stocks (Financials) equals 1 for year 2008, and 0 otherwise. In models 1-4,
we use negative return as a dummy variable, which is 1 for years with a negative return,
and 0 otherwise. Negative return dummy has a positive and significant coefficient,
implying slower price discovery during periods of negative returns. In models 5-8, we
use risk-free interest rate and log of number of stocks as additional explanatory variables
and find qualitatively similar results.
4. Short selling and crisis
Since the 1600s, short selling and regulations restricting short selling have been
topics of debate and controversy, particularly in periods surrounding financial crisis.
Regulators are quick to blame short sellers for steep declines in valuations and sometimes
allege they manipulate stock prices. In the United States, there were relatively few
restrictions on short selling during the 1920s.
Brokers could borrow stocks from their customers or other brokers. Alternatively,
stock lending could be done through a centralized market on the floor of the NYSE
(Jones and Lamont, 2002). Many argue that short selling was responsible for the market
crash of 1929. After a big fall in the markets during 1937, an uptick rule was
implemented to restrict short selling in 1938. Apparently, the uptick rule exacerbated the
market decline during the crash of 1987.
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Table 2. Price discovery regression
We compute yearly time-series of price discovery measure using daily returns of all NYSE-listed stocks and value
weighted market returns for the period from 1926 to 2009. We calculate price discovery by computing the average of crossautocorrelation between lagged value-weighted market return contemporaneous individual stocks returns for the day. A higher
cross-autocorrelation implies slower price discovery. In Panel A, we estimate the regression with the cross-autocorrelation as
our dependent variable and short selling regulation changes separately in each model as the independent variable. In models 1
and 5, we look at the effect of tick restrictions, which take the following values; 0.5 from 1931 to 1937 when downtick
restriction was in place; 1 from 1938 to 2006 when uptick restriction was in place; and 0 for the remaining period. In models 2
and 6, we look at the effect of Investment Act of 1940, which equals 1 for a period from 1940 to 1997, and 0 otherwise. In
models 3 and 7, we look at the effect of Regulation SHO, which equals 1 for a period from 2005 to 2009, and 0 before. In
models 4 and 8, we look at the effect of short sale ban on financial stocks in 2008, which equals 1 for year 2008, and 0
otherwise. In models 1-4, we control for negative return by using a dummy which is 1 for years with negative market return,
and 0 otherwise. In models 5-8, we also control for number of stocks and risk-free interest rate along with negative return
dummy. Number of stocks is the number of firms with available stock price in CRSP database. Risk-free rate for the period
before 1954 is from Siegel (1992). For the period after 1954, we take the risk-free interest rate from Federal Reserve website.1

Intercept
Tick
Restrictions
1940
Investment
Act
Regulation
SHO
Ban on a
subset of
stocks
(Financials)
Negative
return
1

Model 1
Model 2
0.0432** 0.0333***

Model 3
0.08***

Model 4
0.0725***

0.0329*

Model 5
0.8634***

Model 6
0.5936***

Model 7
0.3897***

Model 8
0.4891***

0.0843***

0.0545***

0.0535***
-0.1194***

-0.0997***

-0.1771***
0.0353** 0.0387***

0.0308**

0.0411***

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
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-0.1353***
0.0264**

0.0299***

0.0251**

0.0316**

Table 2–continued
Model 1
Ln (no. of
stocks)
Risk-free rate

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

-0.1285***
0.0113***

-0.0831***
0.0075***

-0.0479**
0.0074***

-0.0634***
0.0085***

0.4023

0.2941

84

84

Adjusted R
Square
0.0744
0.2529
0.3107
0.1601
0.3845
0.4127
No. of
Observations
84
84
84
84
84
84
The symbols ***, **,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively

The uptick rule makes index arbitrage more difficult as arbitrages have to wait before they can short sell a stock on an
uptick. This resulted in an uncoupling of equity and future markets on October 19, 1987, resulting in a crash (Macey, Mitchell
and Netter, 1989). During the dot-com bubble in late 1990s, there were substantial short sale restrictions on internet stocks
(Ofek and Richardson, 2003), which further supports the argument that the prices can go above fundamentals in the absence of
short sellers.
Short selling regulations have been at center stage during the recent financial crisis. While the SEC relaxed the short
sale constraints in September 2007 by removing the uptick rule, it reversed its stance during 2008 and took several measures to
restrict short selling. The SEC banned naked short selling in 19 financial firms in July of 2008 followed by a short selling ban
for 797 financial firms in September. In an interview with the Washington Post, the SEC chairman Christopher Cox said that
agreeing to the three-week ban on short selling of financial companies in September was the biggest mistake of his tenure. He
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acknowledged publicly that this ban was not productive, and said that he was under
intense pressure from Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. and Fed Chairman Ben S.
Bernanke to take this action and did so reluctantly. They "were of the view that if we did
not act and act at that instant, these financial institutions could fail as a result and there
would be nothing left to save".
More recently, European authorities have responded to the Greek debt crisis by
imposing bans on short selling. The Capital Market Commission of Greek Market
decided to ban short selling on the Athens Stock Exchange on April 28, 2010 effective
until June 28, 2010. In a similar move, Germany’s market regulator, BaFin, announced a
ban on naked short selling of eurozone government debt and shares of 10 major financial
companies on May 18, 2010. The ban runs through March 31, 2011 and also applies to
naked credit default swaps involving eurozone debt.
5. A detailed analysis of short selling in the recent times
We perform a detailed analysis of short selling in recent times using data from
shortsqueeze.com2, CRSP, and the SEC website3, where we obtain fails to deliver data.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
We use short interest data from shortsqueeze.com for the sample of 797 financial stocks
which had a short sale ban in 2008 and a matched sample of stocks which did not have a
short sale ban. This is a fortnightly data with information on the number of shares short,
shares float, total shares outstanding, trading volume, and institutional ownership among
others. We access this data for the period from November 2007 to October 2009.
2

Shortsqueeze.com is the premier source for short interest data for U.S. stocks.

3

Available at http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/failsdata.htm
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We create a matched sample of stocks with no short sale ban based on market
capitalization, trading volume, listing exchange and option listing status. We present the
descriptive statistics of our sample data in Table 3. The mean value of short shares as a %
of float for the short sale ban stocks is 3.81%, the corresponding number for the matched
sample has a mean value of 3.27%.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics
We present the descriptive statistics for the sample of 797 financial stocks that had
short sale ban and a matched sample of stocks which did not have a short sale ban for a
period from November 2007 to October 2009. Short interest is defined as the total
number of outstanding shorted shares for each stock. Short as % of float is defined as
short interest divided by number of shares float. Days to Cover is the number of days
required for cumulative daily trading volume to equal the current number of shorted
shares outstanding. Trading volume is specified in terms of number of shares. %
Institutional ownership is the % of shares held by institutional investors such as mutual
funds, hedge funds, and pension plans. Short interest and trading volume are in million
units and market capitalization is in billion units. All mean values are value-weighted.
Short sale ban stocks
Stocks with no short sale
ban
Mean Median
Std
Mean Median
Std
Short interest
39.4
0.41
26.6
40.9
0.40
18.4
Short as % of float
3.81
2.26
7.33
3.27
2.20
8.57
Days to cover
3.12
4.30
16.9
3.17
3.60
15.0
Trading volume
34.5
0.04
20.5
19.0
0.06
6.91
Market capitalization
53.3
0.16
11.2
67.8
0.20
18.0
% institutional ownership 64.2
29.3
26.3
66.1
43.5
33.7

Next, we plot the time-series of value-weighted short interest as a % of float for
the stocks with a short selling ban and matched sample of firms with no such ban in
Figure 1 for the same period. The short interest as % of float for the stocks with short sale
ban became much higher than the matched sample before the short sale ban
implementation. We see a dramatic decrease in short interest of financial stocks after the
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SEC’s short selling ban on 797 financial stocks and a curb on naked short selling on
September 17, 2008. We also see a decline in the matched sample in which there was no
such ban, although for these stocks the decline is not as severe as the sample of stocks
which had a short sale ban.
We also look at another important aspect of short selling where some market
participants choose not to deliver the security on due date even if it is available to
borrow. They may be doing so specifically to avoid the borrowing cost for hard-toborrow stocks (Evans et al., 2009). With the primary motivation of avoiding these fails to
deliver practices, regulators introduced T+3 closeout rule (204T) on September 17, 2008.
Fails to deliver shares represent the aggregate net balance of shares that failed to be
delivered as of a particular settlement date and this data is available from the SEC
website. The SEC adopted 204T temporary rule and eliminated Options Market Maker

5.5
5

Short shares as % of float
Short selling ban on 797 stocks;
Rule 204 T added to Reg SHO

4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2

Stocks with banned short

matched stocks

Figure 1. Short shares as % of shares float for the two subgroups
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exception from regulation SHO on September 17, 2008. The commission made the Rule
204T permanent as Rule 204 in July, 2009.
We plot the 5-day moving average of aggregate fails to deliver shares for all
stocks from 2005 to 2009 in Figure 2. We find the SEC’s rule to be effective in reducing
aggregate fails to deliver quantity.

Fails to deliver(billions)
2.5

Rule 204 T

2
1.5
1
0.5
0

Figure 2. Five-day moving average of aggregate fails to deliver quantity for all
stocks

5.2. Divergence of opinion
Miller (1977) hypothesizes that short sale constraints cause stock prices to be
overvalued in the presence of dispersion of opinion among investors. Short sale
constraints prevent traders with a negative outlook on the stock from selling that stock if
they do not own it. Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) indirectly test this hypothesis
by using short stock rebate rates, the relative short interest level, and the presence of
exchange-traded options as a proxy for short sale constraints. They find evidence of
significant overvaluation for stocks that have short selling constraints and higher
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dispersion of opinion, although there was no explicit ban on short selling in their sample.
Recent short sale ban in 2008, when the SEC placed short selling restrictions on 797
financial firms presents an ideal scenario to more directly test Miller’s theory. We use
CRSP dataset to form quintiles based on dispersion of opinion for stocks with short sale
ban and matched sample of stocks with no bans. Following Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007),
we measure dispersion of opinion as the standard deviation of residuals from ordinary
least squares (OLS) market model using 250-day pre-event estimation window preceding
the short selling ban:

Rit = αi + βiRMt + ε, and Dispersion = σε

(2)

We divide the sample into five quintiles of stocks ranging from lowest to highest
dispersion of opinion. Next, we calculate abnormal returns for the Nq stocks in quintile q
for each day of the ban period in the stocks with short sale ban and compare them with
the abnormal returns in the matched sample with no ban:

,

∑  −  −   
"
=
! | $ ∈ q

(3)

We report the abnormal return on September 18th, September 19th and the
cumulative abnormal return during ban period for the stocks with short sale ban and for
matched sample in Table 4. For stocks with a short sale ban, we find that the abnormal
return for stocks with the highest dispersion of opinion in quintile 5 is higher by 3.80%
and statistically significant as compared to stocks with lowest dispersion of opinion in
quintile 1 on September 18, while this difference for matched stocks is only 0.04% and

20

insignificant. On September 19, the corresponding numbers are 2.11% and 0.89%,
although insignificant. The cumulative abnormal return during the ban period for quintile
5 is higher by 18.58% for stocks with short sale ban.

Table 4. Abnormal return in dispersion of opinion quintiles
We form quintiles of stocks with short sale ban and matched stocks based on
dispersion of opinion. We measure dispersion of opinion by standard deviation of
residuals (RSTD) from market model for the 250 day pre-event estimation window (280,-31) preceding the short sale ban. Next, we calculate abnormal returns in these stocks
for each day during the ban period. We present equal-weighted abnormal returns for each
quintile.
Stock with short sale ban
Stock with no short sale ban
RSTD
Sep 18Sep 18#Obs 18-Sep
19-Sep
Oct 8
18-Sep
19-Sep
Oct 8
Quintile
1
130
1.86%
2.38%
3.79%
-0.14%
-0.98%
-3.40%
2
127
4.43%
2.11%
9.75%
-0.98%
0.32%
-9.08%
3
130
3.13%
1.68%
10.4%
0.57%
-0.38%
-11.6%
4
129
4.47%
3.12%
10.4%
0.55%
0.17%
-7.99%
5
127
5.66%
4.49%
22.4%
-0.10%
-0.09%
-19.7%
p-value
(Diff 5-1)
0.9682
0.3655
<0.0001
<0.0001 0.1934 <0.0001

These findings support the theory that stocks with high dispersion of opinion
become overvalued under short sale constraints. For the matched sample, we have the
opposite findings. The abnormal return for quintile 5 is lower by 16.25%. Thus, matched
stocks with higher dispersion of opinion perhaps become the new target of short sellers.
6. Summary
The role of short sellers in stock trading and efficient pricing is a hotly debated
topic. We present a historical background on the evolution of short selling regulations
and the specific rules in effect at the time of major financial crises in the U.S. Most
restrictions on short selling are triggered by a sharp decline in the stock market.
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Nonetheless, short selling is considered as an essential tool of efficient markets and
therefore the restrictions are usually lifted after market recovery. We look at the quality
of price discovery in the stock markets before and after each major change in the short
selling regulations.
Short selling restrictions have several formats and can affect the trading process in
general, a set of stocks, or a set of market participants. We find that the tick restrictions
implemented in 1930s and short selling restrictions on mutual funds implemented in 1940
both hamper price discovery. In contrast, the Regulation SHO’s curb on naked short
selling implemented in 2005 and SEC’s temporary short selling ban on financial stocks in
2008 do not hamper the overall price discovery in stock markets. On February 24, 2010,
the SEC approved a variation of the “uptick rule” to place curbs on short sales. This rule
applies to stocks that decline at least 10% in a single day. For such stocks, short selling
will be allowed only if the price of the sale is above the highest bid price nationally. In
other words, short sellers cannot automatically execute a marketable sell order against the
best bid price in the limit order book, as they can under normal circumstances. This curb
will be in place for the remainder of the day when stock falls 10% and the next trading
day. The nature of this rule makes it similar to the trading halts commonly adopted by the
exchanges around the world. We conjecture that this rule will prevent abuse of short
selling, but not at the cost of severe deterioration in the price discovery process.
We study in detail several aspects of recent short selling regulations in 2008. We
find that the outstanding short interest levels were very high before the SEC banned
naked short selling in 19 stocks in July 2008 and then banned short selling in 797
financial firms in September 2008. We find that the measures taken by the SEC to curb
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naked short selling and to reduce fails to deliver in securities were very effective in
achieving their respective purposes. Also, we test Miller (1977) hypothesis by looking at
the effect of short selling ban on groups of stocks with varying degrees of dispersion of
opinion. Stocks with high dispersion of opinion and short sale ban generate a high
abnormal positive return after the short sale ban consistent with the hypothesis. We find
diagonally opposite and interesting findings for a matched sample of stocks with no short
sale ban. In that no-ban sample, stocks with high dispersion of opinion generate a
negative abnormal return implying that the short sellers begin to target alternative firms
with similar characteristics after short selling ban on financial stocks.
Future research can characterize the dynamics between short selling restrictions
and price discovery in an international context. In particular, the recent Greek crisis and
naked short selling ban implemented by the European authorities, which requires preborrowing of securities, present a fertile ground for further research on the nuances of
short selling regulations.
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Chapter 3
Short selling: The Impact of SEC Rule 201 of 2010
1. Introduction
In February 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) voted 3-2
to adopt Rule 201 (“Alternative Uptick Rule”), imposing restrictions on short selling.
Rule 201 is a variation on the 70 year old “uptick rule” that was eliminated in 2007. Rule
201 applies to National Market System (NMS) securities following an intra-day price
decline of more than 10% from the previous day’s closing price (hereafter, trigger date).
For such stocks (hereafter, target stocks), the SEC allows short selling only if the
transaction price is above the national best bid at the time of order submission. This
restriction applies for the remainder of the trigger date after the target stock has fallen
10% and the whole of the following trading day. Rule 201 requires trading centers to
establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures that are reasonably
designed to prevent the execution or display of a prohibited short-sale order.
The SEC believes that Rule 201 will help prevent potentially manipulative or
abusive short selling, and, thereby, help restore investor confidence. According to SEC
Chairman Mary Schapiro, "It is a rule that is designed to preserve investor confidence
and promote market efficiency, recognizing short selling can potentially have both a
beneficial and harmful impact on the market." By placing restrictions in only a few
securities that decline, and not a complete ban, the SEC is attempting to preserve the
benefits of short selling under normal market conditions. These benefits include increased
liquidity and price efficiency. However, when the market is stressed, short selling may
artificially exacerbate the price decline in a security. Rule 201 allows sellers who already
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have a long position to sell at the best bid ahead of short-sellers. Further decline in a
stock’s price due to manipulative trading will be less likely, even though prices can
continue to decline due to long selling when fundamentals are truly deteriorating. Rep.
Gary Ackerman (D., N.Y.) applauded the SEC's action, saying it is a "vital step toward
combating the artificial manipulation of stocks."
The SEC’s action was severely criticized by many, including the two Republican
commissioners, who argued that there was no evidence that short selling had led to the
market crash. Following the SEC’s request for comments, several concerns were raised
about the potentially harmful effects of Rule 201 such as reduced market volume, poorer
liquidity and price efficiency, wider bid-ask spreads, higher intra-day volatility,
overpricing of stock, loss of confidence among long sellers due to pending short volume,
loss of confidence among investors who buy overpriced stocks and subsequently suffer
losses, and increased transaction costs as market participants need to incur significant
compliance costs estimated to be $2 billion in the first year and then $1 billion a year
(Johnson (2010)). There were several other concerns about the trigger level, the duration
of Rule 201, and the lack of exemption for market makers.1 Thus, Rule 201 was met with
mixed reactions from the industry and the regulators.
We make several contributions to the short selling literature by providing the first
rigorous analysis of the effectiveness of Rule 201. First, we compare the daily and
intraday short selling volume for target stocks before and after both the effective date and
the full-compliance date using data from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) for NYSE and Nasdaq stocks. Even before the approval of Rule 201, we find
1

Rule 201 does not provide any exemption for auctions used to open and close stocks, although
there are some exemptions for certain transaction, including arbitrage transactions and odd lot transactions.
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that daily short selling declines on days with an intraday return of -10% from the
previous day’s close. Using intraday short volume data, we find that even the intraday
short selling volume has a natural tendency to decrease in the minutes after a stock has
experienced a 10% intraday decline. Second, we analyze the short selling on extreme
market movement days. In particular, we focus on the extreme down days, when shortsellers may be viewed as playing a negative role in the market. We do not find any
evidence of higher short selling in target stocks on these extreme days even before the
approval of Rule 201. Third, we analyze the future recovery of target stocks from their
lowest point. We find that stocks recover better in the absence of Rule 201 and conclude
that Rule 201 may have worsened the return dynamics rather than improving them.
Fourth, we examine the effectiveness of Rule 201 by analyzing short selling
volume around the flash crash day and by simulating short-sale orders during the crisis
period of 2008. Even after its approval, Rule 201 is ineffective in preventing a sudden
market crash such as the flash crash of May 6, 2010.2 Rule 201-compliant execution rate
of simulated short-sale orders during the 2008 crisis period is as high as 83% within 5minutes of order submission, which indicates that Rule 201 would not be binding on
short-sellers during the crisis period, if it had existed at that time. Fifth, we analyze the
impact of Rule 201 on the liquidity of affected stocks. Our liquidity measures are closing
bid-ask spreads and share trading volume. The change in liquidity on the day following
the 10% decline is no better after Rule 201’s full-compliance date than in the period prior
to Rule 201’s approval. Finally, our multivariate regressions control for several well
known determinants of short selling and we find that Rule 201 discourages short selling
2

Moreover, short selling volume is not higher on days of significant market-wide decline like the
flash crash day.
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slightly more than the negative returns themselves. However, it does not appear to be an
effective tool in preventing short selling during crisis periods.
2. Background information and literature review
Short selling is defined as a transaction in which a trader sells a stock without
owning it. The short-seller must borrow the stock to make delivery to the buyer.
Otherwise, a fail to deliver occurs on the settlement day. To close a short position, the
dealer must buy back the stock in the future and return it to the lender. The gain or loss is
the difference between selling price and buying price (ignoring commissions and
borrowing costs). Whether or not short selling is a desirable market feature is a question
that has always generated controversy. Proponents of short selling cite several benefits.
Short-sellers provide a substantial amount of additional liquidity in stock markets. In the
year 2005, short sales represented 31% of share volume for NASDAQ-listed stocks and
24% of share volume for NYSE-listed stocks (Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009b). Short
selling by market professionals, such as market makers, provides liquidity to buyers by
offsetting temporary imbalances in buying and selling interest. Short-sellers also provide
liquidity to sellers. This happens when the short-sellers are buying back the stock to
cover their position. Short-sellers play an important role in ensuring that stocks trade at
fair prices in line with their fundamentals. In particular, they prevent stocks from
becoming overvalued. Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) and Chang, Cheng and Yu
(2007) find that when short selling is constrained or restricted, stocks become overvalued,
and, subsequently, underperform. Ofek and Richardson (2003) document that the
limitations in the ability of short-sellers to trade internet stocks created the dot-com
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bubble, although Battalio and Schultz (2006) reject this claim.3 Because short-sellers do
not own the stock, they are motivated by perceived information and not by liquidity
needs. Therefore, one can expect to see speedier and more immediate price adjustment
with short selling instead of a prolonged drift in prices after negative news such as
announcements of poor earnings. Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007) find some evidence
that prices incorporate negative information faster in countries where short sales are
allowed and practiced. Another benefit of short selling is that it makes arbitrage possible
and helps in linking derivatives markets such as futures and options with cash markets,
ETFs with cash markets, and underlying stocks with ADR markets.
Critics of short selling argue that short-sellers may push a stock’s price below its
fundamental value by engaging in predatory short selling and bear raids. In a bear raid, a
group of traders attempts to hammer the price of a stock down by taking large short
positions, and, subsequently, spreading negative sentiments or rumors about the target
firm. This price decline triggers margin calls for long investors, causing some of them to
close out their position by selling, resulting in a further price declines. Shkilko, Van Ness
and Van Ness (2011) find that even on no-news days, short selling may cause excessive
price pressure resulting in temporary price declines that are followed by a rebound of
90% to 110% of the initial decline by the end of the day. They find that short-sellers are
abnormally active during the beginning of the price decline. However, we do not observe
this pattern after a 10% price decline for stocks on which Rule 201 is applicable.

3

Battalio and Schultz (2006) claim that investors could easily short stocks synthetically by
purchasing puts and writing calls. They suggest that traders did not bet against Internet stocks because they
did not know that the Internet stock prices were too high.
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Financial regulators have historically attempted to balance the benefits and pitfalls
of short selling. Many restrictions were placed on short selling after the great depression
of 1929. The NYSE prohibited short selling on downticks in 1931 and the SEC
introduced a related uptick rule later in 1938, to prevent bear raids. The uptick rule
specified that a stock can only be shorted at a transaction price that is at least one tick
higher than the price of the most recent trade with a different price. Jones (2008)
examines these depression-related restrictions and finds that the average return associated
with these events is positive and the restrictions caused an increase in liquidity. In
contrast, Macey, Mitchell and Netter (1989) argue that the uptick rule hampers index
arbitrage by uncoupling the equity and futures market, and that it was responsible for the
crash of October 1987. Alexander and Peterson (1999) show that the execution quality of
short-sale orders is adversely affected by the uptick rule, stifling price discovery in both
bull and bear markets. However, Boehmer and Wu (2010) find that the uptick rule had no
effect on price efficiency of stocks.
Short selling again emerged as a topic of vigorous debate and controversy during
the financial crisis of 2008. The SEC had just relaxed short-sale constraints in September
2007 by removing the uptick rule shortly before the crisis. In a complete reversal of its
policy, the SEC then implemented a short selling ban on 797 financial firms on
September 17, 2008 in response to the financial crisis. Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2009)
study the impact of this short selling ban on market quality. They find that the ban caused
a degradation in market quality as measured by spreads, price impact, and intraday price
volatility. Their findings suggest that the boost in prices of the banned securities may
have been due to the TARP program, which was announced at the same time and not due
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to the ban on short selling. Kolasinksi, Reed and Thornock (2009) confirm that the SEC’s
June 2008 emergency order to ban naked short selling in 19 financial firms degraded their
market quality and liquidity. Beber and Pagano (2011) examine this issue in an
international context and find similar results about the ban’s effect on market quality.
They find that imposing bans or regulatory constraints on short selling reduced market
liquidity, especially for stocks with small market capitalizations, high volatility, and no
listed options. They also find that the bans slow down the price discovery process and fail
to support stock prices, except possibly for U.S. financial stocks, which received TARP
funding. Battalio and Schultz (2011) find that September 2008 short sell restrictions also
impacted equity options markets. The bid-ask spread for options on banned stocks
dramatically increased and the synthetic share prices for banned stocks became
significantly lower than the actual share prices during this ban period.
The paper most closely related to ours is Diether, Lee and Werner (2009a) who
study the effect of the removal of the uptick rule. While they examine the effect of the
SEC-mandated temporary suspension of short-sale price tests in 2007 for a set of pilot
securities, we examine the effect of Rule 201 that has the opposite intention. Rule 201,
which was approved by the SEC in 2010, again imposes price tests, but in a slightly
different format. Diether, Lee and Werner (2009a) find that the suspension of the
NYSE’s uptick rule and Nasdaq’s bid price test makes it somewhat easier to execute
short sales. They also argued that the effect of removing the price tests on market quality
were limited. Another study by Alexander and Peterson (2008) also examines the effect
of removal of short-sale price tests and finds that traders benefit from the removal of
price tests and receive faster execution of trades. They also find that the removal of price
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tests does not lead to a degradation of market quality, and conclude that such restrictions
should be removed.
Clearly, there is a need for a fresh examination of short selling behavior. We
examine how the newly promulgated Rule 201 has affected the dynamics of short selling.
The SEC’s new Alternative Uptick Rule is expected to make short selling more
difficult for securities that decline 10% or more on any particular day. In this regard,
another paper closely related to ours is Blau, Van Ness, Van Ness and Wood (2010). For
days with extreme increases (up days) and extreme decreases (down days) in the level of
the overall market index, these authors examine the short selling of S&P 500 index stocks
traded on the NYSE. They find that short selling increases on large down days and
decreases on large up days, suggesting that short-sellers follow the crowd on extreme
market movement days. There are two key distinctions between their paper and ours.
First, they focus on extreme market movements, whereas we focus on extreme individual
stock price movements. We also perform a conditional analysis in which we
simultaneously investigate the variations in market returns and individual stock price
returns. This difference is important because they find that short selling increases on days
of overall market decline, whereas we find that short selling decreases on days of
individual stock price decline even on days of extreme market decline. Our findings
about the impact of market-wide returns on short selling reconcile with their results, but
the effects of market-wide returns and individual stock price returns on short selling
behavior are opposite to each other. Second, their work is a general analysis of short
selling, whereas we provide the first analysis of this issue in the presence of the new Rule
201. Our goal is to extend this literature along the dimensions of the role of short-sellers
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on stock-days with extreme intraday returns and the need for restricting short selling on
these stock-days, if any.
3. Data sources and descriptive statistics
We extract and merge data from three sources: Datastream International, FINRA,
and TAQ. We begin to form our sample with all NYSE and Nasdaq listed stocks for a
period from September 1, 2008 to May 9, 2011. Following Diether, Lee and Werner
(2009b), we exclude stock-days with lagged price below $5. We also exclude stock-days
with lagged price above $999. We use the following variables (mnemonics in
parenthesis) from Datastream International: Price (P), Unadjusted price (UP), Return
index (RI) Intraday high price (PH), Intraday low price (PL), Opening price (PO),
Turnover by volume (VO), Unadjusted price ask (UPA), Unadjusted price bid (UPB),
Ex-dividend date (XDDE), Market Value (MV), and common shares outstanding
(W05301). We identify all ex-dividend days for our sample from Datastream
International using Ex-dividend date (XDDE). We calculate unadjusted return as
(Pt – Pt-1)/Pt-1 and dividend adjusted return index as (RIt – RIt-1)/RIt-1. For ex-dividend
days, dividend adjusted return minus the unadjusted return represents the daily dividend
yield. For these stock-days, we adjust the intraday high return and intraday low return by
adding back the daily dividend yield to them as Rule 201 does not apply to price drops
resulting from corporate actions such as dividend payments. We also exclude stock-days
which have an unadjusted closing bid-ask spread greater than $2.
We download the daily short-sale volume files and monthly short-sale transaction
files for NYSE TRF, NASDAQ TRF, and ADF from the FINRA website from the first
available date of August 3, 2009 to May 9, 2011. The daily files provide aggregated
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short volume for each firm. The monthly files provide transaction-by-transaction detail of
short-sale trades reported to a consolidated tape.
We merge the FINRA transaction files with trade and quote (TAQ) data to assess
the intraday conditions at the time of actual short-sale trade execution. In particular, the
TAQ files enable us to obtain the exact time stamp of a 10% price decline that triggers
Rule 201. TAQ data is also required to assess the effectiveness of Rule 201 in restricting
the execution of simulated short-sale orders during crisis periods.
Using a stock’s intraday high and low prices, we calculate its intraday high return
and intraday low return relative to the stock’s closing price on the previous day. We
classify the stock-days in our sample into six groups as follows: (i) Intraday low return
<= -10%; (ii) -10% < Intraday low return <= -5%; (iii) -5% < Intraday low return < 0%;
(iv) 0% < Intraday high return < 5%; (v) 5% <= Intraday high return < 10%; (vi) 10% <=
Intraday high return. If a stock has an intraday decline of -10%, we place it in the first
group. For all other cases, since a volatile stock-day may potentially fall into multiple
categories, we use the absolute value of the intraday high and intraday low returns as an
additional criterion for allocating the stock-day in only one of the above groups. If the
absolute value of the intraday high return is greater than the absolute value of the intraday
low return, we assign the stock-day to the applicable intraday high groups, and viceversa.4 Table 1 illustrates the distribution of the average number of stocks in each of the
stock-day groups. On average, our final sample has 4,324 stocks on each day. About 27
stocks priced above $5 have an intraday decline of 10% or more on a typical day during

4

For example if stock A experiences -12% and +13% intraday return on the same day, we allocate
it to the first group of intraday low return below 10%. If another stock B experiences -4% and +6% return
on the same day, we allocate it to the fifth group of intraday high return between +5% and +10%.
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our sample period and about 33 stocks have an intraday price increase of 10% or more.
We also present the mean and standard deviation of market capitalization (in millions)
and price of stocks in each stock-day group in columns 4 through 7. Stocks with a lower
market capitalization and a lower price are much more likely to fall in the extreme groups
of intraday returns above +10% or below -10% than larger stocks or high priced stocks.

Table 1
Descriptive statistics
We present descriptive statistics for the stock-day groups formed based on the intraday
low return and the intraday high return, as described in more details in the header for
Figure 1. Our analysis period begins in August 2009 and ends in May 2011. For each
return group, we provide the daily average number of stocks, and the mean and standard
deviation of market capitalization (in millions) and prices.
Number
Market
of stocks
capitalization
Price
Daily
Stock-day group
Average
Mean
Std
Mean Std
Intraday low return <= -10%
26.6
1,159
6,961
16.0 22.7
-10% < Intraday low return <= -5%
178.7
1,384
6,527
17.4 20.1
-5% < Intraday low return < 0%
0% < Intraday high return < 5%
5% <= Intraday high return < 10%
10% <= Intraday high return

1,943
1,959
183.9
32.6

3,521
3,568
1,372
677

14,412
14,494
5,758
3,043

25.1
25.4
17.3
14.6

29.1
28.7
19.7
21.2

Although, Rule 201 was approved by the SEC on February 24, 2010, it had an
effective date of May 10, 2010, and the SEC gave all trading centers six months to
comply. Some exchanges were unable to adhere to the original compliance deadline of
November 10, 2010. Therefore, on November 4, 2010, the SEC extended the fullcompliance date to February 28, 2011.5 On February 28, Kenneth Cole Productions Inc.
5

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Memo No. 34-61595 (February 26, 2010). SEC
Memo No. 34-63247 (November 4, 2010).
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and Timberline Resources Corp. were among the first stocks for which Rule 201 was
triggered. We divide our sample period into four sub-periods. The pre-approval period
ranges from August 3, 2009 to February 23, 2010, the post-approval period ranges from
February 24, 2010 to May 9, 2010, implementation period ranges from May 10, 2010 to
February 27, 2011, and full-compliance period ranges from February 28, 2011 to May 9,
2011.
4. Results
4.1 Daily short selling volume before and after Rule 201
For each stock on each day, we compute relative short selling (relss) as short
selling volume of a stock in FINRA as a proportion of its total trading volume in FINRA.
In Figure 1, we plot the difference between the relative short selling on day t and relative
short selling on day t-1, where t is the day on which we form the portfolios of the six
stock-day groups based on their intra-day low or high return described earlier. For stockdays with missing short selling data, we do one of the following two things. If the stock
appears in FINRA on at least 1 day during the entire sample period, then we assign a
short volume of 0 to that stock on the missing short volume day. Otherwise, if the stock
does not appear in FINRA at all during the entire sample period, we exclude that stock
from our analysis. In general, the figure shows that relative short selling decreases on
negative return days. Relative short selling is particularly lower on day t as compared to
day t-1 in Rule 201’s target stocks even before Rule 201’s approval. We see a similar
pattern for the other two negative return groups. Relative short selling increases only on
positive return days. In sum, we do not see any evidence that an increase in short selling
exacerbates a price decline after the stock price has already dropped significantly.
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Figure 1
Month-by-month short-selling
For each stock for each day t, we calculate the return from the previous day’s closing
price to the lowest and highest trade price. We form six stock-day groups: (1) Intraday
low return <= -10%; (2) -10% < Intraday low return <= -5%; (3) -5% < Intraday low
return < 0%; (4) 0% < Intraday high return < 5%; (5) 5% <= Intraday high return < 10%;
and (6) 10% <= Intraday high return. If a stock has an intraday decline of -10%, we place
it in the first group. For all other cases, if the absolute value of the intraday high return is
greater than the absolute value of the intraday low return, we assign the stock-day to the
applicable intraday high groups, and vice-versa. We define relative short selling (relss) as
short selling volume as a percentage of total trading volume. For each month from
August 2009 to May 2011, we plot change in relsst and relsst-1.
Formal analysis in Table 2 again points to the same pattern--relative short selling
declines on negative return days. We separately analyze the pre-approval period (Panel
A), the post-approval period (Panel B), the implementation period (Panel C), and the full-
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compliance period (Panel D) surrounding Rule 201. For each return group within these
periods, we present relative short selling on day t-1, day t, and day t+1, where t is the day
on which we form six portfolios based on intraday high and low returns. In column 5, we
present the difference between relative short selling on day t and day t-1 to assess the
relationship between short selling and intensity of contemporaneous intraday returns. For
all the negative return groups, relative short selling is lower on day t compared to day t-1
in all four periods surrounding Rule 201. In contrast, relative short selling on day t
increases for all positive return groups in all four periods. The difference between relative
short selling on day t and day t-1 for target stocks is -1.96% even in the pre-approval
period. In other words, short volume usually declines on its own for the stocks that Rule
201 attempts to regulate. Thus, Rule 201 appears to be addressing a non-existent
problem. Rule 201 would only help if there was a negative relationship between
contemporaneous intraday returns and short selling. In reality, this relationship is
positive, as we can see in the monotonically increasing difference between relative short
selling on day t and day t-1 moving from intraday low return groups to intraday high
return groups in each panel. We also present the difference between relative short selling
on day t+1 and day t-1 in column 6 and again find that the short selling was not
increasing for the target stocks, even before Rule 201 was approved.
Negative returns continued to discourage short sellers after the approval of Rule
201. In the full-compliance period, the difference between relative short selling on day t
and day t-1 for target stocks is -8.19%. In Table 2 Panel E, we compare the pre-approval
period and the full-compliance period. The decline in relative short-selling on day t is
6.23% higher in full-compliance period than in the pre-approval period, for the stocks
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Table 2
Short selling volume by stock-day group
We define relative short selling as the ratio of short selling volume to total volume times
100. For each day t we classify stocks into one of six groups using the procedure
described in Table 1. We present relative short selling on days t-1, t, and t+1 for each of
our six groups in columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively. We also present the difference
between relative short selling on day t and t-1 in column 5 and on day t+1 and day t-1 in
column 6. Panel A presents the relative short selling before the approval date, Panel B
covers the period from the approval date to the effective date, Panel C covers the period
after the effective date to the full compliance date, and Panel D covers the period after the
full compliance date. In Panel E, we present the differences in pre-approval period and
full-compliance period changes in relative short selling.
Relative short selling on day
Difference
Stock-day group
t-1
t
t+1
t-(t-1)
Panel A: Pre-approval period (August 3, 2009 to February 23, 2010)
Intraday low return <= -10%
31.2 29.2 30.2
-1.96***
-10% < Intraday low return <= -5%
35.3 33.8 34.1
-1.56***
-5% < Intraday low return < 0%
35.8 34.8 35.0
-0.99***
0% < Intraday high return < 5%
35.2 36.9 36.2
1.69***
5% <= Intraday high return < 10%
35.2 39.8 37.5
4.66***
10% <= Intraday high return
32.5 39.2 34.8
6.73***
Panel B: Post-approval period (February 24, 2010 to May 9, 2010)
Intraday low return <= -10%
36.23 33.03 34.62 -3.19***
-10% < Intraday low return <= -5%
37.21 35.79 36.00 -1.43***
-5% < Intraday low return < 0%
36.47 35.37 35.62 -1.10***
0% < Intraday high return < 5%
36.25 37.79 37.09 1.54***
5% <= Intraday high return < 10%
36.72 40.69 38.37 3.97***
10% <= Intraday high return
35.68 42.08 36.98 6.40***
Panel C: Implementation period (May 10, 2010 to February 27, 2011)
Intraday low return <= -10%
33.21 30.76 31.67 -2.45***
-10% < Intraday low return <= -5%
36.50 35.30 35.33 -1.21***
-5% < Intraday low return < 0%
35.41 34.64 34.79 -0.77***
0% < Intraday high return < 5%
35.25 36.30 35.75 1.05***
5% <= Intraday high return < 10%
36.90 39.96 38.16 3.06***
10% <= Intraday high return
35.12 39.09 35.47 3.97***
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Difference
(t+1)-(t-1)
-0.96**
-1.19***
-0.72***
1.04***
2.35***
2.31***
-1.61***
-1.21***
-0.85***
0.84***
1.65***
1.29*
-1.54***
-1.18***
-0.62***
0.50***
1.26***
0.35

Table 2–continued
Relative short selling on day
Difference Difference
Stock-day group
t-1
t
t+1
t-(t-1)
(t+1)-(t-1)
Panel D: Full-compliance period (February 28, 2011 to May 9, 2011)
Intraday low return <= -10%
33.70 25.50 26.80 -8.19***
-6.89***
-10% < Intraday low return <= -5%
34.13 31.96 33.07 -2.18***
-1.06***
-0.65***
-5% < Intraday low return < 0%
34.74 33.95 34.10 -0.79***
0% < Intraday high return < 5%
34.25 35.51 34.91 1.26***
0.66***
5% <= Intraday high return < 10%
35.49 38.64 36.36 3.14***
0.87**
10% <= Intraday high return
35.48 37.82 34.80 2.34***
-0.69
Panel E: Differences between full-compliance and pre-approval changes in shortselling (Panel D-Panel A)
Intraday low return <= -10%
-6.23***
-5.94***
-10% < Intraday low return <= -5%
-0.62*
0.13
-5% < Intraday low return < 0%
0.19**
0.08
0% < Intraday high return < 5%
-0.42***
-0.38***
5% <= Intraday high return < 10%
-1.51***
-1.48***
10% <= Intraday high return
-4.39***
-2.99***
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

that decline 10%. The corresponding decline on day t+1 is 5.94% higher in fullcompliance period than in the pre-approval period. In the next section, we further analyze
the impact of the rule on short selling during extreme market movement days.
4.2 Short selling volume on extreme market movement days
The results presented so far are based on individual stock price returns, which
have a positive relationship with short selling volume, i.e., short selling volume is higher
on positive return days and lower on negative return days. The overall market return is an
additional dimension that affects short-selling. Blau, Van Ness, Van Ness (2010)
demonstrate that short selling volume decreases on extreme market up days and increases
on extreme market down days. In light of these opposite effects of individual stock
returns and market-wide returns, we integrate these two determinants of short selling
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volume by forming 12 different portfolios. These correspond to the 6 portfolios based on
individual stock price returns described previously, but now we also take into account
whether the market-wide return was extremely positive or extremely negative. Our
method of selecting days of extreme market movements is similar to Dennis and
Strickland (2002), Lipson and Puckett (2007) and Blau, Van Ness, Van Ness and Wood
(2010). We calculate the mean and the standard deviation of the close-to-close marketwide returns based on S&P 500 index values at the end of its measurement day and the
end of the previous day. Extreme market movement days are defined as the days on
which close-to-close market-wide return is two standard deviations above or below the
mean. During our sample period, we find 15 extreme-market-down days and 12 extrememarket-up days.
The results are presented in Table 3. Panel A focuses on extreme-market-down
days and Panel B on extreme-market-up days. Within each market condition panel, we
present 3 columns focusing on the overall time period, the pre-approval period, and the
full-compliance period surrounding Rule 201.6 For brevity, in Table 3, we directly
present the changes in the relative short selling, which correspond to the difference
columns of Table 2. A vertical comparison of this difference in relative short selling in
Table 3, Panel A and Panel B, for the overall time period indicates that indeed market
condition is an important determinant of short selling volume, consistent with Blau, Van
Ness, Van Ness, Wood (2010).

6

For full-compliance period, we sort the days by market return and consider bottom-5 and top-5
as extreme down days and extreme up days, respectively.
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Table 3
Short selling volume during extreme market movements
First, we present relative short selling on days of extreme market movements for the overall sample period. Then, we divide
the sample period into two sub-periods surrounding Rule 201’s approval--the pre-approval period and the full-compliance
period. We present changes in relative short selling from day t-1 to day t and from day t-1 to day t+1, where day t is the day on
which we assign each stock to a return group. Panels A and B present changes in relative short selling for the days of extreme
negative market movements and for the days of extreme positive market movements, respectively. To determine the extreme
market movement days, we calculate close-to-close returns for the S&P 500 for August 3, 2009 to May 9, 2011. After
calculating the mean of daily returns, we select days when the S&P 500 return is two standard deviations above or below the
mean.
Relative short selling difference
Overall time period
Pre-approval
Full-compliance
Return group
t-(t-1)
(t+1)-(t-1)
t-(t-1)
(t+1)-(t-1)
t-(t-1)
(t+1)-(t-1)
Panel A: Short selling on extreme down days
Intraday low return <= -10%
-2.98***
-0.83**
-4.15***
-2.31**
-6.24***
-3.45**
-10% < Intraday low return <= -5%
-0.50***
-0.67***
-1.42*** -1.27***
-1.82***
-0.76
-5% < Intraday low return < 0%
0.86***
0.08
-0.17
-0.76***
1.28***
0.00
0% < Intraday high return < 5%
3.44***
2.12***
3.74***
3.46***
3.00***
2.07***
5% <= Intraday high return < 10%
3.96***
1.03
3.65***
1.71
5.20***
3.10**
10% <= Intraday high return
3.63**
0.09
2.49
-0.27
1.70
-0.85
Panel B: Short selling on extreme up days
Intraday low return <= -10%
-3.43**
-1.86
-0.43
3.41
-10.13***
-8.77***
-10% < Intraday low return <= -5%
-2.66***
-3.37***
-1.57
-1.34
-2.28
-0.42
-5% < Intraday low return < 0%
-2.30***
-2.14***
-1.70*** -1.66***
-3.09***
-2.08***
0% < Intraday high return < 5%
-1.32***
-0.40***
-0.38*
-0.09
-1.65***
-0.47**
5% <= Intraday high return < 10%
0.87***
1.12***
3.13***
1.92***
-0.06
0.24
10% <= Intraday high return
4.38***
3.04***
5.82***
3.45***
0.92
0.06
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Overall, more positive changes in relative short selling on day t in Panel A
relative to Panel B confirm that relative short selling increases on large down days and
decreases on large up days.7 The relative short selling on the following day, i.e., t+1, is
not as tightly related to the extreme market return on day t. Thus, the impact of extreme
market return on short selling lasts for a very short duration. More importantly, the
stock’s own return plays a more important role in determining the amount of short selling
for the stocks subject to Rule 201.
Controlling for the market condition within each panel of Table 3, our previous
results hold for the group of stocks for which Rule 201 applies. Relative short selling
decreases for the stocks with a 10% price decline, whether the market condition is
extremely negative or extremely positive. This pattern applies to the overall time period,
pre-approval period, and the full-compliance period. For example, relative short selling
decreases by 4.15% in stocks on days of a 10% price decline in the pre-approval column
of Table 3, Panel A. Even for the extreme up days in Table 3, Panel B, relative short
selling decreases by 0.43% for this group of stocks which are affected by Rule 201. Thus,
our main results are robust to extreme market conditions. Typically, short selling in the
stocks targeted by Rule 201 declines in all market conditions, limiting the need for any
regulatory intervention.
4.3 Intraday analysis of short selling volume before and after Rule 201
Our findings are further strengthened when we perform an intraday analysis of
short selling volume for stock-days with an intraday decline of 10% for a 5-month period

7

For example, on extreme down days, short selling increases by 0.86% for the group of stocks
which decline by 0 to 5%. In contrast, for extreme up days, short selling decreases by 1.32% for the group
of stocks which increase by 0 to 5%.
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from September, 2009 to January, 2010. We begin by plotting the intraday split of short
selling volume and overall trading volume including all buys and sells. We divide each
target stock-day into thirteen 30-minute intervals. We sum short selling volume from
FINRA and overall trading volume from TAQ in each of these intervals. We compute the
intraday split of daily short selling volume by dividing the sum of the short selling
volume in each 30-minute interval by the total short selling volume of the entire trading
day. Next, we compute the intraday split of overall trading volume for each 30-minute
interval, analogously. In Figure 2, we plot these intraday proportions of short selling
volume and intraday proportions of trading volume. We find a U-shaped pattern in
overall trading volume as reported by McInish and Wood (1990). More interestingly,
proportional short selling volume shows a similar U-shaped pattern and almost overlaps
proportional total trading volume throughout the day, except when the market opens. We
do not see meaningfully higher proportional short selling volume as compared to
proportional total trading volume in any 30-minute interval of the day.
Next, we perform an intraday analysis based on the actual time-stamp of the 10%
decline for each stock-day. This analysis is important because we can focus specifically
on the short selling volume after the conditions of Rule 201 are met for any given stock.
For example, if a particular stock trades at a price near the previous day’s close for most
of the day, but suddenly drops by 10% at 3 pm, we would be more interested in the shortselling around 3 pm instead of the coarser information included in the aggregated daily
short selling volume. Although, FINRA transaction-by-transaction short data has time
stamps for each trade, it does not contain information on the exact time Rule 201 is
trigged.
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Intraday short volume and overall trading volume
Proportion of daily volume

18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%

Time of the day
Short selling volume
Trading volume

Figure 2
Intraday pattern of short selling volume and total trading volume
For a 5-month period from September, 2009 to January, 2010, we sum short selling
volume and trading volume for each 30-minute interval of the trading day for stocks that
meet the trigger condition of Rule 201. We divide the sums of the short selling volume in
each 30-minute interval by the total short selling volume of the entire trading day. Next,
we repeat the analysis for daily trading volume. We plot these two intraday time series of
proportional short selling and proportional total volume for each 30 minute interval.

Using the TAQ dataset, we identify the exact time of each 10% decline and form
a merged dataset following the procedure described as follows. We begin with TAQ data
for all the stocks that decline by 10% on any given day relative to previous day’s closing
price. We divide each of these days into the periods before and after the 10% decline.8
The mean time at which stocks in our sample decline 10% is 11:55:58 am. We sum the
short selling volume in the time periods before and the after the 10% price decline. Table
8

FINRA monthly short sale transaction files are available from August 2009, but we exclude
monthly short sale transaction files for the month of August because NASDAQ TRF file for that month
truncates all symbols to 3-characters. For example, AAPL appears as AAP in that file. FINRA corrected
this error in the data files for September 2009 onwards.
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4, Panel A, shows that the proportion of short selling volume that occurs before (after)
the 10% decline is 36.58% (63.42%) of the total short selling volume for the day.
Next, again using the TAQ dataset, we compute the intraday split of daily total
trading volume for the periods before and after the 10% decline each day. The proportion
of trading volume (including buys, sells and short sells) that occurs before (after) the 10%
decline is 35.51% (64.49%) of the total short selling volume for the day. If there is
excessive short selling after a 10% decline, then the difference of the short selling
proportion and the volume proportion for the period after the price decline should be
significantly greater than 0. The difference of -1.07, reported in column 4 of Table 4,
shows that the proportion of short selling in the period after the 10% price decline is not
significantly higher than the proportion of total trading volume in that period.
We consider stocks that decline 10 % in greater detail by comparing the intraday
split of their short volume and intraday split of their total trading volume. We examine
the intraday split of the short selling volume from the opening trade until the time that the
stock declined 2%, using the total short selling volume for the trading day. For example,
consider a stock X that declines from previous day’s close of $10 to $9.80 at 10:00 am
and 150 shares are traded during those thirty minutes, of which 68 shares are sold short.
If the total short selling volume during the day from 9:30 am to 4 pm for stock X is 1,000
shares and total trading volume during the day is 3,000 shares, then the ratio of short
selling volume corresponding to 2% decline is computed as 68/1000 (6.8%) and the ratio
of total trading volume corresponding to 2% decline is computed as 150/3000 (5.0%).
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Table 4
Intraday analysis of short selling volume for days with 10% intraday declines
This table is based on the 5-month period from September, 2009 to January, 2010. In
Panel A, for each stock-day with an intraday decline of 10% or more, we divide the day
into the time before and after the 10% decline. We sum the short selling volume
separately in the period before and in the period after the price decline. We divide the
short selling volume in each period by the aggregate daily short selling volume. We
repeat the analysis for daily trading. For the periods before and after the price decline, we
report the mean percentage of short selling volume in column 2 and the percentage of
trading volume in column 3. In column 4, we report the difference in the percentage short
selling volume and trading volume. In Panel B, for each day for each stock, we divide the
day into the following 11 time periods: (1) Until 2% decline (2) Between 2% to 4%
decline (3) Between 4% to 6% decline (4) Between 6% to 8% decline (5) Between 8% to
10% decline (6) Between 10% to 12% decline (7) Between 12% to 14% decline (8)
Between 14% to 16% decline (9) Between 16% to 18% decline (10) Between 18% to
20% decline (11) After 20% decline. We present the percentage of short selling volume
and the percentage of trading volume for each of the 11 periods. In Panel C, we repeat
this analysis for thirty 1-minute intervals around the 10% decline.
Intraday split
of daily short
selling volume

Intraday split
of total daily
volume

Difference

Panel A: Short-selling
before and after 10% decline
Until 10% decline
After 10% decline

36.58%
63.42%

35.51%
64.49%

1.07%**
-1.07%**

Panel B: Short-selling in 2% decline
intervals for stocks that decline 10%
Until 2% decline
Between 2% to 4% decline
Between 4% to 6% decline
Between 6% to 8% decline
Between 8% to 10% decline
Between 10% to 12% decline
Between 12% to 14% decline
Between 14% to 16% decline
Between 16% to 18% decline
Between 18% to 20% decline
After 20% decline

6.81%
4.83%
6.24%
8.06%
10.65%
27.67%
14.17%
6.73%
4.99%
2.93%
6.94%

4.84%
4.69%
6.42%
8.28%
11.27%
28.45%
14.32%
6.88%
4.94%
2.91%
6.99%

1.97%***
0.14%
-0.18%
-0.22%
-0.62%***
-0.78%**
-0.15%
-0.15%
0.05%
0.02%
-0.05%
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Table 4- continued
Intraday split
of daily short
selling volume

Intraday split
of total daily
volume

Difference

0.25%
0.21%
0.20%
0.22%
0.22%
0.29%
0.23%
0.24%
0.29%
0.38%
0.32%
0.38%
0.47%
0.53%
4.77%

0.24%
0.25%
0.26%
0.31%
0.25%
0.31%
0.32%
0.32%
0.34%
0.42%
0.41%
0.47%
0.51%
0.70%
2.90%

0.01%
-0.04%
-0.06%
-0.09%***
-0.03%
-0.02%
-0.09%***
-0.08%***
-0.05%
-0.04%
-0.09%***
-0.09%*
-0.04%
-0.17%**
1.87%***

0- to 1-minute after 10% decline
2.08%
6.44%
1- to 2-minutes after 10% decline
0.80%
1.01%
2- to 3-minutes after 10% decline
0.69%
0.86%
3- to 4-minutes after 10% decline
0.48%
0.69%
4- to 5-minutes after 10% decline
0.54%
0.65%
5- to 6-minutes after 10% decline
0.46%
0.64%
6- to 7-minutes after 10% decline
0.53%
0.62%
7- to 8-minutes after 10% decline
0.54%
0.55%
8- to 9-minutes after 10% decline
0.44%
0.53%
9- to 10-minutes after 10% decline
0.52%
0.49%
10- to 11-minutes after 10% decline
0.53%
0.50%
11- to 12-minutes after 10% decline
0.48%
0.49%
12- to 13-minutes after 10% decline
0.45%
0.43%
13- to 14-minutes after 10% decline
0.41%
0.44%
14- to 15-minutes after 10% decline
0.44%
0.45%
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

-4.36%***
-0.21%**
-0.17%**
-0.21%***
-0.11%**
-0.18%***
-0.09%
-0.01%
-0.09%**
0.03%
0.03%
-0.01%
0.02%
-0.03%
-0.01%

Panel C: Short-selling in thirty
1-minute interval around 10% decline
15- to 14-minutes before 10% decline
14- to 13-minutes before 10% decline
13- to 12-minutes before 10% decline
12- to 11-minutes before 10% decline
11- to 10-minutes before 10% decline
10- to 9-minutes before 10% decline
9- to 8-minutes before 10% decline
8- to 7-minutes before 10% decline
7- to 6-minutes before 10% decline
6- to 5-minutes before 10% decline
5- to 4-minutes before 10% decline
4- to 3-minutes before 10% decline
3- to 2-minutes before 10% decline
2- to 1-minutes before 10% decline
1- to 0-minute before 10% decline
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Next, we examine the intraday split of the short selling volume from the time that
the stock declined 2% until the time that the stock declined 4%, using the total short
selling volume for the trading day. We repeat this analysis for the interval of a 4%
decline to a 6% decline, a 6% decline to an 8% decline, and so forth until the stock has
declined 20%. Finally, we repeat the analysis for the period from the time of a 20%
decline until the end of the trading day.9 We calculate similar intraday splits for each of
these intervals for trading volume.
In Table 4, Panel B, we compare the intraday split for short selling and trading
volume that we described in the previous paragraph. Before the 10% decline, we find that
short selling volume is abnormally higher than trading volume only in the period until a
2% decline. For the other periods before the 10% decline, short selling volume is either
not abnormally higher or is significantly lower. Short selling is not abnormally high in
any of the intervals after a 10% decline. In fact, for the interval of 10% to 12% decline,
the difference between proportional short selling and proportional trading volume is
-0.78% and statistically significant, indicating that short selling is lower after a price
decline, even before the approval of Rule 201.
In Table 4, Panel C, we take a more detailed look at short-selling in thirty 1minute intervals around the 10% decline. This panel is based on a combination of return
time and calendar time. For example, if a stock declines by 10% at 12:00 PM, the first
group, 15- to 14-minute before decline, is based on the clock time of 11:45 AM to 11:46
AM. For that particular stock, the last group in Table 4, Panel C, i.e., 14- to 15-minute
9

For stocks that experience an intraday low return which is higher than the range of an interval,
we assign a value of 0 for total trading volume and short selling volume for that interval. For example, a
stock with an intraday low return of -17% will be assigned a value of 0 for trading volume and short selling
volume for intervals of -18% to -20% return.
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after decline is based on the clock time of 12:14 PM to 12:15 PM. These clock times are
unique for each stock-day based on the exact time of a 10% decline. Short selling is not
higher in any of the 1-minute intervals after a 10% decline. In fact, for the first 6 1minute intervals following a 10% decline, the difference between proportional short
selling and proportional trading volume is negative and statistically significant, even
without Rule 201.
4.4 Stock return dynamics before and after Rule 201
In this section, we analyze whether Rule 201 has changed the way in which short
selling affects contemporaneous and future stock returns. In Table 5, we present the
contemporaneous closing return, future opening return, and future closing return. For the
pre-approval period in Table 5, Panel A, we find that the stocks with an intraday decline
of 10% or more have an average closing return of -9.14%. If short-sellers were
manipulating prices of these stocks in a negative direction after a 10% decline, then we
would expect the closing return to be lower than -10%. Thus, Rule 201 does not have any
significance for the returns on the trigger date. Even prior to Rule 201’s approval, these
stocks have a positive future opening return of 0.42% and a positive future closing return
of 0.52%, indicating that the short selling restrictions imposed by Rule 201 on the next
day are not needed from a valuation perspective.
We also analyze the returns in the full-compliance period to investigate whether
Rule 201 has helped improve the contemporaneous return of the target stocks by making
it less negative than the -9.14 in the pre-approval period or improved the future returns
by making them more positive than 0.42%. Since Rule 201 is in full-compliance from
February 28, 2011, the contemporaneous return is actually more negative at -9.39% in the

51

full-compliance period, suggesting that Rule 201 is not only ineffective, but may actually
be damaging for the target stocks’ valuation. The analysis of future returns gives the
same message. After Rule 201 became effective, future closing return is -0.44%, whereas
it used to be 0.52% before Rule 201’s effective date. Instead of improving the return
dynamics of target stocks Rule 201 may have worsened it.

Table 5
Return dynamics before and after Rule 201
This table presents the average contemporaneous and future returns relative to the trigger
date or the date on which each stock is allocated to one of our six stock-day groups.
Contemporaneous return is calculated as the closing price on the trigger or allocation date
minus the closing price on the previous day divided by the closing price on the previous
day. The future opening return is defined as the opening price on day t+1 minus the
closing price on day t divided by the closing price on day t. The future closing return is
defined as the closing price on day t+1 minus the closing price on day t divided by the
closing price on day t. Panel A covers the period before the approval date of Rule 201
and Panel B covers the period after the full compliance date of Rule 201.
Future
Future
return
return
Contemporaneous
return
(opening)
(closing)
Stock-day group
Panel A: Pre-approval period
(August 3, 2009 to February 23,
2010)
Intraday low return <= -10%
-9.14
0.42
0.52
-10% < Intraday low return <= -5%
-4.07
0.14
0.09
-5% < Intraday low return < 0%
-0.99
0.10
0.07
0% < Intraday high return < 5%
1.08
0.04
0.13
5% <= Intraday high return < 10%
4.28
0.08
0.12
10% <= Intraday high return
10.25
0.24
-0.03
Panel B: Full-compliance period
(February 28, 2011 to May 9, 2011)
Intraday low return <= -10%
-10% < Intraday low return <= -5%
-5% < Intraday low return < 0%
0% < Intraday high return < 5%
5% <= Intraday high return < 10%
10% <= Intraday high return

-9.39
-3.92
-0.91
0.89
4.30
10.97
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0.27
-0.07
0.01
0.14
0.37
0.45

-0.44
-0.29
-0.04
0.14
0.10
0.07

This return analysis also provides the rational for why short selling does not
increase for the target stocks even prior to Rule 201’s approval. Any momentum trader
who short sells a stock at a price 10% below the previous day’s closing price actually will
incur a loss of 0.86% if they cover their position at the closing price of the same day. If
they continue to hold their position, they will incur an additional loss of 0.42% by the
next day’s open or 0.52% by the next day’s close. In addition to the loss due to negative
return, a short-seller also incurs stock borrowing fees in the form of lower interest
rebates, and other transaction costs such as commissions and spreads. Table 5, Panel B,
shows that although Rule 201 has not dynamically altered the return dynamics, the
direction of the change is undesirable, because it has worsened the gains for contrarian
traders, who were previously helping the markets by stepping in to buy the target stocks
after their huge price decline. Contrarian traders who buy the stock after 10% decline, on
average gained 0.86% by the end of the day, before the approval of Rule 201. This gain
has diminished to 0.61% now in the full-compliance period of Rule 201.
4.5 Analysis of short selling volume on May 6, 2010 Flash Crash
Now, we analyze whether Rule 201 can help further the SEC’s goal of market
stability by preventing sudden market crashes. On May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average witnessed the biggest intraday point decline. Did short-sellers have a big hand in
causing the flash crash? We investigate whether there was a sudden spike in short selling
on that day. In Table 6, we report the relative short selling on the flash crash day and
compare it with the normal relative short selling on the previous day. On that day, had it
existed, Rule 201 would have trigged restrictions for 1,469 stocks compared to only 27
stocks on an average day. Another 1,561 stocks had an intraday decline between 5% and
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10% on that day compared to 179 on an average day. But, Rule 201 would not have
altered the short selling behavior or the return outcome on that day. Relative short selling
was not higher on May 6 and May 7 than the relative short selling on May 5. Clearly, the
crash was not the result of any spike in short selling volume because there was no spike
on that day for the target stocks that declined by 10%.

Table 6
Short selling volume around flash crash (May 6, 2010)
We present relative short selling on day t-1, t, and t+1 for the stock-day groups formed
based on the intraday low return and the intraday high return on the day of the flash
crash, May 6, 2010. We also present the difference between the relative short selling on
day t and t-1 in column 6, and the difference between the relative short selling on day t+1
and day t-1 in column 7.
Percentage short volume on day
No of
(t+1)Return group
stocks t-1
t
t+1
t-(t-1)
(t-1)
Intraday low return <= -10%
1469 37.0 34.3 36.5 -2.78***
-0.53
-10% < Intraday low return <= 5%
1561 39.7 41.0 38.3 1.32*** 1.40***
-5% < Intraday low return < 0%
812 32.6 34.8 33.0
2.22**
0.34
0% < Intraday high return < 5%
249 34.4 40.2 31.9
5.75**
-2.50
5% <= Intraday high return <
10%
93
36.8 38.2 32.1
1.48
-4.66**
10% <= Intraday high return
53
35.7 40.0 38.4
4.25
2.71
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

4.6 Execution rate of Rule 201 compliant short orders during periods of financial crisis
Can Rule 201 contribute to market stability during the periods of financial crisis?
In our opinion, Rule 201 will be considered effective if short-sellers are not able to
execute their orders immediately during periods of steep decline in stock prices. To
assess the potential bindingness of Rule 201 if it had existed during the crisis period of
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September-October 2008, we compute the rule-compliant execution rate for simulated
short-sale orders during 0-5 minute periods after order submission using the procedure
described below.
For each day on which Rule 201 would theoretically apply to a given stock for the
entire trading day, we simulate a round-lot short-sale order at every 5-minute interval.
For example, the first simulated short-sale order is placed at 9:35 am, 5 minutes after the
open of trading hours. The second simulated order is placed at 9:40am. The last simulated
short-sale order is placed at 3:55 pm, 5 minutes before the close of the trading hours. All
simulated short-sale orders adhere to Rule 201 with respect to their limit price in relation
to the NBBO. For example, if the market is at $20.00 bid and to $20.05 offered for a
stock at the time of submission of the simulated short-sale order, then we assign the limit
price of $20.01 to this order. Any trade at or above $20.01 after this order submission
will count as an execution of that particular short-sale order. Also, if the bid changes
from $20.00 to $20.01 or above, we assume that the simulated short-sale order executes.
In Table 7, we present the rule-compliant execution rates of these simulated shortsale orders within each 1-minute interval during the next 5 minutes. In Table 7, columns
2 and 3, we report the results for the crisis period of 2008. In column 2, we report the
percentage of simulated orders that are executed and in column 3, we report the
cumulative percentage of simulated orders executed. We find that even in the simulated
presence of Rule 201, a large majority of simulated orders (82.7%) are executed within 5
minutes of order placement during the crisis period of 2008. Thus, Rule 201 is not
particularly binding on short selling in stocks with serious price declines. Moreover, the
cumulative fill rate of 82.7% during the crisis period is much higher than the cumulative
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Table 7
Simulation of short-sale orders during the crisis period and normal periods
We simulate short-sale orders at every 5-minute interval for stocks-days on which Rule 201 would apply for the entire day if it
had existed in September 2008 – October 2008 and September 2008 – October 2009. We present the hypothetical rulecompliant execution rates of these short-sale orders in the next five 1-minute interval in the presence of the hypothetical
alternative uptick rule in column 2 and column 4. Column 3 and 5 report the cumulative percentage of simulated short-sale
orders that are executed. In column 6, the difference between cumulative execution rates during crisis period and normal
period is reported.
Crisis period (Sept 2008-Oct 2008)
Cumulative
Percentage of
short sell
percentage
orders
of short sell orders
Time interval
executed
executed (C1)
First 1-minute
69.2
69.2
1-minute to 2-minute
6.6
75.8
2-minute to 3-minute
3.3
79.0
3-minute to 4-minute
2.2
81.2
4-minute to 5-minute
1.6
82.7
*** represents significance at 1%.

Normal period (Sept 2009-Oct 2009)
Cumulative
Percentage of
percentage
short sell orders
of short sell orders
executed
executed (C2)
44.7
44.7
7.3
52.0
4.1
56.0
2.9
58.9
2.2
61.1

Difference
(C1-C2)
24.52***
23.80***
23.00***
22.30***
21.64***

fill rate of 61.1% during the normal non-crisis benchmark period of September-October 2009 reported in column 5. In the last
column of Table 7, we present the difference in cumulative percentage of executed short-sale orders between crisis period and
normal period. If Rule 201 effectively curtails short selling during crisis, then these differences should be negative. In reality,
we
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observe that these differences are positive and significant. In other words, in times of
high volatility and potential crisis, this rule seems ineffective in curtailing short-selling.
Instead, Rule 201 seems is more binding during periods of low volatility when it is not
really needed.
4.7 Liquidity measures before and after the effective date of Rule 201
Rule 201 prevents short-sellers from readily executing their orders at the current
bid price and, thus, can potentially result in decreased liquidity in the affected stocks. We
analyze the changes in liquidity of the target stocks in the 3-day period enveloping the
date of the 10% decline. In Table 8, we report the results separately for the pre-approval
period in Panel A and the full-compliance period in Panel B. In both panels, we report
the liquidity measure on day t-1, day t (the trigger date), and day t+1 in columns 2
through 4. We report the mean and median of the difference between the liquidity
measures on day t+1 compared to day t-1 in column 5. We find that the turnover on day
t+1 is significantly higher than the turnover on day t-1 in both panels. Before approval of
Rule 201, the mean turnover increases by 386,240 shares after a day of 10% decline,
while the corresponding increase in the full-compliance period is 504,790. In the preapproval period, the mean bid-ask spread on day t+1 is significantly lower by 2.27 cents
than the bid-ask spread on day t-1 resulting in a liquidity improvement. The
corresponding decrease in mean bid-ask spread during the full-compliance period is 2.00
cents. Although the changes in median bid-ask spreads are statistically significant
according to Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank test, they are not economically significant as
the medians themselves remain unchanged in the periods surrounding 10% price decline.
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In Table 8, Panel C, we report the differences in differences analysis of these two
periods. The difference is difference for mean bid-ask spread is 0.27 cents and the
difference in difference for the mean turnover is 118,550 shares but both are statistically
insignificant. Thus, there is no clear indication of liquidity improvement or deterioration
as a result of Rule 201.

Table 8
Liquidity changes around 10% price declines
We present the mean and median values of bid-ask spread (in cents) and turnover (in
thousands of shares) on day t-1, day t, and day t+1, where day t is the day of a 10% price
decline. In column 5, we report the difference in each liquidity measure on day t+1 and
day t-1. In Panel A, we use the data before the approval of Rule 201 and in Panel B, after
the full-compliance date. In Panel C, we report the difference in differences analysis for
these two periods. The significance level for differences in medians is based on
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
Day t-1

Day t

Day t+1

Panel A: Pre-approval period
(August 3, 2009 to February 23, 2010)
Mean bid-ask spread
22.88
21.93
20.61
Median bid-ask spread
5.00
5.00
5.00
Mean turnover
1281.0
2821.3 1667.2
Median turnover
147.30
341.00 192.50
Panel B: Full-compliance period
(February 28, 2011 to May 9, 2011)
Mean bid-ask spread
9.06
8.61
7.06
Median bid-ask spread
2.00
2.00
2.00
Mean turnover
1267.1
3608.7 1771.9
Median turnover
271.7
866.5
401.4
Panel C: Differences in Differences
Panel B - Panel A:
Mean bid-ask spread
Mean turnover
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively
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Day (t+1)
- Day (t-1)

-2.27***
0.00***
386.24***
45.20***

-2.00***
0.00***
504.79***
129.70***

0.27
118.55

4.8 Regression analysis of daily relative short selling
In Table 9, we report the results of the estimation of a multivariate regression with
daily relative short selling for the target stocks as the dependent variable. The key
explanatory variables are indicator variables for the effective date and the fullcompliance date of Rule 201. The regression equation, which includes several known
determinants of short selling from Diether, Lee and Werner (2009b) and Christophe,
Ferri, and Angel (2009) as control variables, is:

relss(t) = α0 +α1 after effective date + αx after full-compliance date + α2 return-5,-1
+ α3 returnt + α4 spreadt + α5 relss-5,-1+ α6 σt + α7 σ-5,-1 + α8 σt + α9 σ-5,-1 + α10 tv-5,-1
+ α11 Monday + α12 Tuesday + α13 Thursday + α14 Friday + ε

(1)

The after effective date indicator variable takes a value of 1 for May 10, 2010 onwards,
and a value of 0 prior to that. The full-compliance date indicator variable takes a value of
1 for a period from February 28, 2011 onwards, and a value of 0 prior to that. return-5,-1 is
the return for a stock from the closing price on day t −6 to the closing price on day t −1.
returnt is the return of a stock on day t defined as (Pt – Pt-1)/Pt-1. spreadt is the day t
stock-level closing proportional bid-ask spread. σt is the difference in the high and low
price on day t divided by the high price. σ−5,−1 is average daily σ from day t −5 to day t −
1. tv−5,−1 is the average daily share turnover of a stock for day t−5 to day t −1. Monday,
Tuesday, Thursday and Friday are the day-of-the-week dummy variables.
We report the coefficients from 3 alternative specifications based on all or subsets
of the above variables. In all 3 specifications, the coefficient for after effective date is
statistically insignificant. The coefficient for full-compliance date is negative and
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Table 9
Regression results
We regress daily relative short selling (relss) on after effective date and after fullcompliance date indicators and other control variables. We estimate regressions for
August 2009 to May 2011. The indicator variable after effective date takes a value of 1
for the implementation period after May 10, 2010, and a value of 0 prior to that date. The
indicator variable after full-compliance date takes a value of 1 for the full-compliance
period after February 28, 2011, and a value of 0 prior to that date. We follow Diether,
Lee and Werner (2009b) for the control variables in this regression. return-5,-1 is the return
for the stock from the closing price on day t−6 to the closing price on day t−1. returnt is
the return of a stock on day t defined as (Pt – Pt-1)/Pt-1. spreadt is the day t stock-level
closing proportional bid-ask spread. σt is the difference in the high and low price on day t
divided by the high price: (high − low)/high. σ−5,−1 is the average daily σ from day t −5 to
day t−1. tv−5,−1 is the average daily share turnover of the stock for day t−5 to day t−1.
Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday are the day-of-the-week dummy variables.
Dependent variable: relss(t)
Model 1
Model 2
Model3
Intercept
0.3075***
0.2079***
0.2029***
After effective date
0.0001
-0.0047
-0.0034
After full-compliance date
-0.0526*** -0.0486*** -0.0477***
return-5,-1
0.0113
0.0125
0.1902***
0.1801***
returnt
spreadt
-0.5368*** -0.5196***
0.4583***
0.4561***
% short vol-5,-1
σt
-0.1050*** -0.1174***
σ-5,-1
-0.2329*** -0.2130***
tv-5,-1
0.0170
0.0157
Monday
-0.0055
Tuesday
0.0013
Thursday
0.0122**
Friday
0.0060
Adjusted R-Square
0.0045
0.1661
Number of observations
11,324
8,414
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

60

0.1670
8,414

statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, short selling decreased further after the fullcompliance date of Rule 201. However, this reduction may have poor consequences for
market efficiency as short selling already declined in target stocks even without Rule 201.
Moreover, although Rule 201 reduces short selling during our sample period, based on
our previous analysis of simulated rule-compliant orders, it is not effective in preventing
short selling during a crisis.
Short selling in target stocks increases with contemporaneous returns and past
short volume and is also higher on Thursdays. A contemporaneous return of -10%
reduces relative short selling by 1.8%. Thus, negative returns alone are a sufficient
deterrent for short sellers without any regulatory intervention. Short selling decreases
with spread, contemporaneous volatility, and past volatility. The coefficient for past
turnover is statistically insignificant.
5. Robustness tests
As a robustness test, we also use an alternative measure of short selling following
Christophe, Ferri, and, Hsieh (2010). We compute daily short selling as the ratio of
shorted shares to shares outstanding. Before the approval of Rule 201, we find that there
is no significant increase in daily short selling for the -10% intraday return group, but
there is a more pronounced and significant increase in daily short selling for the +10%
intraday return group. Thus, using this measure also, we do not find any evidence that
short sellers target -10% intraday return group for short selling.
Next, we repeat our analysis of daily relative short selling analogous to Table 2
for the target stocks that continue to decline further and end the day with a return more
severe than -10%. If short selling is being used for manipulating prices in the downward
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direction after a 10% decline, we should see evidence of higher relative short selling on
these stock-days. We use data for August 2009 to January 2010, which is before the
approval of Rule 201. We do not find any evidence of higher short selling in the subsample of stocks that continued to the decline beyond the cut-off point of -10%. Relative
short selling for these stock-days declines by 1.57%, from a level of 35.05% on the
previous day, to 33.48% on the day of 10% decline.
We also perform an intraday analysis of short selling for the same sub-sample of
stocks mentioned above that continue to decline further and end the day with a return
more severe than -10%. We do not find any evidence of higher proportional short selling
volume compared to proportional trading volume after a 10% decline in stock price.10
Since, the stocks are declining in the absence of any increase in short selling, the most
likely cause is a genuine deterioration in their business fundamentals. Thus, Rule 201
appears to be addressing a non-existent problem.
6. Conclusion
The SEC approved Rule 201 on February 24, 2010 to restrict short selling in
stocks that have an intraday decline of 10% or more. Rule 201 was effective on May 10,
2010, but the deadline for full-compliance was extended to February 28, 2011. The
SEC’s goal is to stabilize the market by preventing potentially manipulative, abusive, or
panic-driven short selling. We investigate the pertinence and effectiveness of Rule 201 in
curtailing daily and intraday short selling, ensuring fair valuations and price stability,
promoting higher liquidity and execution quality, and preventing sudden or prolonged
market crises.
10

The robustness analysis is not tabulated for brevity, but the results are available from the authors

on request.
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We find that even prior to the implementation of Rule 201, short selling actually
declined on stock-days with extreme negative returns and increased on stock-days with
extreme positive returns, obviating the need for the rule. Even on extreme market down
days prior to Rule 201’s approval, we find that short selling already declined for the
targeted stocks. This short selling behavior did not change after the full compliance date
although the decline in short selling is much more pronounced, raising concerns about
stocks becoming overvalued.
For each stock declining by 10% on a given day, we divide the day into the period
before and after the 10% decline. We compute the proportional short selling volume from
FINRA and the proportional trading volume from TAQ and find that short selling is not
unusually high in the period after the price decline. Short sellers are more active before
the price decline, not after the decline. Examining ten consecutive breakpoints beginning
from a 2% decline to a 20% decline, we do not find any evidence of an increase in short
selling relative to total trading volume when the stock returns are negative. Furthermore,
we perform a minute-by-minute analysis for a 30-minute calendar time-period
surrounding the 10% price decline and find no evidence that short selling increased
relative to total trading volume.
We also analyze the future recovery of target stocks from their lowest price point.
Even before Rule 201’s approval, target stocks recover from a 10% decline by the end of
the trading day. The next day’s opening and closing returns are also positive on average.
After Rule 201 became effective, the recovery process for the target stocks actually
worsened. The contemporaneous closing return is more negative after Rule 201 than
before. The next day’s opening return is less positive with Rule 201 than without. The
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next day’s closing return is negative after Rule 201 whereas it was positive before.
Overall, we find that the target stocks recover better in the absence of Rule 201 and
conclude that Rule 201 does not have a favorable impact on the valuation dynamics for
the targeted stocks.
To understand the usefulness of Rule 201 in periods of crisis, we examine short
selling on May 6, 2010, the day of the flash crash and also during the September-October
2008 historic financial crisis. Short selling was actually lower on May 6 for target stocks
compared to its normal level a benchmark period. Hence, we conclude that Rule 201
would not have altered short selling behavior or the return outcome on the day of the
flash crash.
We simulate short-sale orders that comply with Rule 201 during September and
October of 2008 to examine the potential effectiveness of Rule 201 in restricting short
selling during the crisis period, if it had been in force. We find that Rule 201 would not
have been binding on short-sellers during the 2008 crisis as the simulated orders executed
at a very high rate.
We also study changes in liquidity for stocks affected by Rule 201. We compare
the liquidity measures 1-day before and 1-day after Rule 201 is triggered. We perform
this liquidity change analysis both for the pre-approval period and full-compliance
period. Our differences in differences analysis indicates that Rule 201 does not affect the
pattern of liquidity changes in the periods surrounding 10% price declines.
Finally, we perform a multivariate regression analysis to test the effectiveness of
Rule 201, controlling for other known determinants of short selling. Short selling
decreases for stocks for which Rule 201 is triggered in the full-compliance period. Short

64

selling in target stocks increases with contemporaneous returns and past short volume and
decreases with spread and volatility.
Overall, we find that Rule 201 discourages short selling although negative returns
by themselves are an effective deterrent for short sellers. We do not find any favorable
evidence about Rule 201’s impact on liquidity or stock valuations. Rule 201 does not
appear to be an effective tool in preventing a sudden market crash or a prolonged
financial crisis.
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Chapter 4
A Comparative Analysis of Short Selling Restrictions
1. Introduction
Short selling has witnessed historic regulatory attention all around the world from
just before the Great Recession of 2008 until now. For several decades from the 1930s to
early 2007 short selling was allowed in the U.S., but there were restrictions on the short
sale trade price. In response to the financial crisis of 2008, the SEC adopted Rule 201,
which was fully implemented in February 2011. However, Rule 201 was hastily adopted
without extensive empirical testing of alternatives. Jain, Jain, and McInish (2011) find
that Rule 201 restricts short selling most when market conditions do not warrant such
restrictions. We compare the efficacy of Rule 201, as adopted, to many alternatives and
find that several alternatives may better accomplish one or more goals of Rule 201
without its disadvantages.
Our evaluation standards include criteria that academics, regulators, and
practitioners have proposed as desirable or undesirable characteristics of a short sale rule.
Factors that we examine include the incidence of short selling, rule trigger frequency,
execution rate of simulated short sale orders, return dynamics, and price efficiency.
We find that short selling volume has a natural tendency to decrease after a 10%
decline irrespective of the short selling regime. We find no evidence of higher short
selling in Rule 201 target stocks on either market down or market up days. Comparing
the trigger rates we find that the rule affects about 137 stocks every day on average. But
the trigger rate of this rule goes as high as 2000-3000 on extreme negative market days
such as flash crash and days following US credit downgrade. Examining the stock
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characteristics of stocks experiencing a 10% intraday decline we find that the majority of
the stocks that are affected by this rule are low-priced, small-cap stocks. For example,
during uptick rule period, out of all stocks that decline 10%, 33 stocks are low-priced and
only 4 stocks are high-priced. Alternatives rules that take into account the higher inherent
volatility of low-priced small-cap stocks generate a more meaningful trigger distribution.
With some simple adjustments to the trigger conditions based on stock’s price level, we
identify a more desirable rule by which 34 high-priced stocks are affected compared to 21
low-priced stocks.
We find that the execution rate of Rule 201 compliant simulated short-sale orders
during the 2008 crisis period is higher at 55.7% within 5-minutes of order submission
compared to 46.8 execution rate during bull period. This indicates that Rule would be
more binding on short-sellers during the bull period, while it is less restrictive during
crisis and bear periods. However, alternative rules with different trigger conditions based
on stock price level and restricting short selling for stocks with high short interest based
on stock’s previous closing price strike a better balance between price efficiency and
crisis prevention. Our proposed rule gets triggered after a 15% decline for a low-priced
stock, after a 10% decline for a medium-priced stock, and after a 5% decline for a highpriced stock. Short sale orders that comply with this rule have a lower execution rate of
26.6% during the crisis period compared to an execution rate of 49.8% during bull
period. Our analysis of price efficiency suggests that prices for target stocks are more
efficient in the absence of any restriction on short selling. Finally, we analyze the price
behavior of target stocks from their lowest point. We find that stocks recover better in the
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absence of any tick restriction on short selling and conclude that short selling bans and
short selling restrictions worsen the return dynamics rather than improving them.
Our overall analysis suggests that amendments to current short selling regulation
and adoption of a rule that accounts for a stock’s price, volatility, and return can simplify
administration of the rule and better achieve the goals of the rule.
2. Literature review and background information
Although there is a rich academic literature analyzing the effects of short selling
on liquidity and price efficiency, most studies have focused on a single rule effective at
any given time. Jones (2008) documents that the downtick restriction in 1931 and the
uptick rule in 1938 had a positive impact on returns and on liquidity. Using data from
several decades later, Alexander and Peterson (1999) show that the uptick rule adversely
affects the execution quality of short sales and price discovery in all market states.
Diether, Werner, and Lee’s (2009a) conclude that the uptick rule’s price tests could be
safely removed without any adverse impact on returns, liquidity, or volatility. Indeed, the
SEC removed the uptick rule in July 2007 but had to reverse course by banning short
selling in 797 financial firms the following year in response to the 2008 financial crisis.
Many other international regulators followed suit in banning short selling. Boehmer,
Jones and Zhang (2009), Kolasinksi, Reed and Thornock (2009), and Beber and Pagano
(2010) find that these bans degrade market quality, slow price discovery, and diminish
market liquidity. According to Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009b) short selling is desirable
as it accounts for 31% of share volume for NASDAQ-listed stocks and 24% of share
volume for NYSE-listed stocks, thus creating significant additional liquidity while
opening and closing their positions. Ofek and Richardson (2003), Asquith, Pathak, and
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Ritter (2005), Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007), and Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007) find
that short sellers prevent stocks from becoming overvalued and without their presence
stocks can easily become mispriced.
The disagreement between regulatory restrictions on short selling and academic
findings about its benefit suggest that neither of the two extremes of unrestricted short
selling or total ban might be a workable solution. We complement this literature by
searching for the optimal level of regulatory intervention by examining many different
rule variations.
Several of regulatory alternatives that we consider are well grounded in practice,
which gives a researcher the ability to test their effectiveness using actual time series data
from different markets around the world. We use a common platform of U.S. equities to
test to analyze all alternatives. We begin with a brief background of the genesis of our
proposed regulatory alternatives. More than four hundred years ago in January 1610 a
regulation prohibiting short selling was enacted after a group of Dutch businessmen short
sold the stock of the East India company. In 1733, naked short selling was banned in
Britain after the market collapse following the South Sea Bubble of 1720. In the U.S.,
short selling was banned from 1812 to 1858 by New York State. Reacting to a decline in
stock markets, the NYSE imposed special short selling and speculator identification
regulations in November 1917. Following the Wall Street crash of 1929, many new laws
were passed to restrict short selling. On October 6, 1931, the NYSE implemented a
downtick rule that prohibited short selling at a price lower than the previous trade price.
On February 18, 1932, the NYSE announced that all brokers were required to obtain
explicit written authorization from their customers before lending their shares. A short-
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short rule was introduced in the taxpayer act of 1936 to discourage active trading and
short selling by mutual funds. The rule required mutual funds to derive less than 30% of
their gross income from the gains on positions held for less than 3 months or from short
sales. After a steep market decline in 1937, the SEC adopted an uptick rule in 1938,
which required short sellers to trade at a price higher than the most recent unique
transaction price. The Investment Company Act of 1940 placed severe restrictions on the
mutual funds’ ability to short. This law was repealed in 1997 following a prolonged bull
market phase. In the same year, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 repealed the ‘shortshort’ rule, which significantly increased the market timing ability of mutual funds (Bae
and Yi, 2008).
In January 2005, Regulation SHO established requirements to "locate" shares
available for borrowing and delivery on the settlement date before executing a short sale,
in an effort to curb naked short selling. Additionally, Reg SHO imposed “close-out” (i.e.,
buyback) requirement for securities with persistent delivery failures at a registered
clearing agency for 13 consecutive settlement days. Other important landmarks in short
selling include removal of the longstanding uptick rule in July 2007, a temporary
emergency rule to stop naked short selling in 19 major financial firms on July 15, 2008,
and a new temporary rule 204T imposing penalties on fail-to-deliver from September 17,
2008,. The SEC also repealed the exception for options market makers from short selling
close out provisions in Regulation SHO in September 2008, when another rule called the
“naked short selling anti-fraud rule” became effective as well to curb deception about the
intention or ability to deliver securities in time for settlement. After normal trading closed
on that day, the SEC initiated a ban on short selling for 797 financial stocks. The short
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selling ban expired on October 8, 2008. On February 24, 2010, the SEC adopted Rule
201, which restricts short selling when a stock has declined more than 10% from the
previous day’s closing price. This rule puts long sellers in the front of the line and will
enable them to sell shares before short sellers.
A closer look at the historical evolution of short selling regulations makes it clear
that policymakers have frequently tightened the rules immediately after a significant
market crash and relaxed them after prolonged bull runs. Thus, stock market return
performance is an important candidate for conditioning variables that can become part of
desirable regulation. A few studies have investigated these issues, but arrived at opposite
conclusions. Macey, Mitchell and Netter (1989) argue that short selling restrictions
hampers index arbitrage by uncoupling the equity and futures market, and that the uptick
rule was in part responsible for the crash of October 1987. However, Shkilko, Van Ness
and Van Ness (2011) find that even on no-news days, short selling may cause excessive
price pressure resulting in temporary price declines that are followed by a rebound of
90% to 110% of the initial decline by the end of the day. They find that short-sellers are
abnormally active during the beginning of the price decline when large negative price
reversals occur on no news days.
Clearly, there is a need for a fresh examination of short selling behavior with
heightened market volatility and new regulations that are in place. Our goal is to extend
the short selling literature by identifying the salient features of short selling rules. By
comparing historical short selling restrictions and simulating new short sale rules, we aim
to give insight into the relative merits of various rules in striking a balance between
preventing manipulative short selling and promoting price efficiency.
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3. Data sources and descriptive statistics
We extract and merge data from Datastream International, RegSHO short sales,
NYSE short sales, FINRA, BATS short sales, and TAQ. We begin with all NYSE and
Nasdaq listed stocks for a period from January 1, 2005 to August 16, 2011. We obtain the
following variables (mnemonics in parenthesis) from Datastream International: Price (P),
Unadjusted price (UP), Return index (RI) Intraday high price (PH), Intraday low price
(PL), Opening price (PO), Turnover by volume (VO), Unadjusted price ask (UPA),
Unadjusted price bid (UPB), Ex-dividend date (XDDE), Market Value (MV), and Exdividend date (XDDE). We calculate unadjusted return as (Pt – Pt-1)/Pt-1. Following Jain,
Jain, and McInish (2011), we calculate dividend adjusted intraday low return. We
exclude stock-days that have an unadjusted closing bid-ask spread greater than $2.
We download the daily short-sale volume files and monthly short-sale transaction
files for NYSE TRF, NASDAQ TRF, and ADF from the FINRA website from the first
available date of August 3, 2009 to August 16, 2011. The daily files provide aggregated
short volume for each firm. The monthly files provide transaction-by-transaction detail of
short-sale trades reported to a consolidated tape. We also add the short selling volume
occurring on the BATS exchange to our daily file. For the crisis period of 2008, we use
NYSE short sale data. For uptick rule period of 2005-2006 in our study, we use
Regulation SHO short sale data. We also use short interest data from shortsqueeze.com
for identifying stocks with high level of short interest.
We merge the transaction files with trade and quote (TAQ) data to assess the
intraday conditions at the time of actual short-sale trade execution. In addition to finding
the exact time stamp of a 10% price decline that triggers Rule 201, the TAQ files enable
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us to compute the trading volume before and after a 10% decline in the stock. TAQ data
are also used to assess the effectiveness of 20 alternative sets of short selling restricting
by computing the execution rate of simulated short-sale orders during crisis, normal, and
bull periods under each alternative.
Using a stock’s intraday low price, we calculate its intraday low return relative to
the stock’s closing price on the previous day. We classify the stock-days in our sample
into three groups as follows: (i) Intraday low return <= -10%; (ii) -10% < Intraday low
return <= 0%; (iii) 0% < Intraday low return. For purpose of simulating alternative rules,
we also classify stock-days that have an intraday decline of 5% and 15%. On average, our
final sample has 5,169 stocks each day. While about 137 stocks have an intraday decline
of 10% or more on a typical day during our sample period, about 506 stocks have an
intraday decline of 5% and 46 stocks have an intraday decline of 15% during our sample
period.
We divide our sample period into five short sale periods: uptick rule, 1 January
2005 to 31 December 2006; ban, 18 September 2008 to 8 October 2008; unrestricted, 9
October 2008 to 27 February 2011; Rule 201, 28 February 2011 to 5 August 2011; and
US credit downgrade, 8 August 2011 to 12 August 2011. Although Rule 201 was
applicable at the time of the US credit downgrade, we analyze this period separately
because of its high volatility.
4. Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
For each sub-period, we present descriptive statistics for short selling in Table 1.
For uptick rule period, we use RegSHO short sale data and CRSP volume data. For the
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short selling ban period, we use NYSE short sales data and compute NYSE volume using
TAQ. For the no tick restrictions, Rule 201, and US credit downgrade periods, we get
short sale volume and total volume from FINRA. In column 3 to 5, we present statistics
(mean, median, and standard deviation) for relative short selling. Relative short selling
has increased from 21.41% during the uptick rule period to 40.48% during the Rule 201
period. In column 6 and 7, we present the mean and standard deviation (return volatility)
of daily S&P500 returns during each period. We find that the average daily return is
lowest and return volatility is highest during the short selling ban period in 2008.

Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Column 1 identifies the dates of four short-selling regimes and column 2 provides a label
for each regime. We present statistics for the ratio of short selling volume to total volume
in columns 3-5. Using closing prices, we calculate the daily return for each stock as (Pt –
Pt-1)/Pt-1. The mean daily returns for each stock for each period are presented in column 6
and the standard deviations of these returns (Return volatility) is presented in column 7.

Sample period

Applicable
short selling
rule

Short selling volume/
Total volume
Mean

Median

Std

Return

Return
volatility

0.64%
1/1/2005-12/31/2006 Uptick Rule
21.41% 21.50% 2.96% 0.03%
Short selling
9/18/2008-10/8/2008 ban
30.99% 31.46% 1.11% 0.01%
1.13%
No tick
8/3/2009-2/27/2011 restriction
39.07% 39.41% 2.70% 0.11%
0.83%
2/28/2011-8/05/2011 Rule 201
40.48% 40.37% 1.16% 0.06%
0.81%
US credit
8/8/2011-8/12/2011 downgrade
40.08% 40.13% 3.04% -0.24%
5.19%
* Uptick rule was in effect from 1938 to 2007. After a pilot study done by SEC, it was
repealed in July, 2007.
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4.2 Frequency and firm characteristics of stocks declining sharply
In Figure 1, we plot daily number of stocks that decline 10% on an intraday basis
from August 2008 to August 2011. There are steep increases in the number of stocks that
have a 10% decline during at the time of the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy (15
September 2008), the flash crash (6 May 2011), and US credit downgrade (5 August
2011).
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Figure 1
Number of stocks that decline 10%
We plot daily number of stocks that decline 10% on an intraday basis beginning from
August 18, 2008 to August 16, 2011.

In Table 2, Panel A, we present the daily average number of stocks that have a
10% intraday decline during each short selling regime. We find that this frequency
reached 814 during the highly volatile short selling ban period. On an extreme day during
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Table 2
Trigger rate and stock characteristics of stocks declining sharply
In Panel A, for stocks that decline 10%, triggering Rule 201 limitations, we present (1) statistics for the daily number of stocks
affected by the rule, (2) statistics for the trigger rate, and (3) the breakdown of the mean number of stocks triggered each day
between stocks triggered on one day only, stocks triggered on 2 consecutive days, and stocks triggered on three consecutive
days. In Panel B, we present the breakdown of our sample by price and market capitalization. In Panel C, we present the
breakdown assuming a hypothetical trigger condition of 5% decline. In Panel D, we assume a hypothetical trigger condition of
15% decline.

Uptick rule

Sept 2008 –
Oct 2008
Short ban

Aug 2009 –
Feb 2011
No restriction

Feb 28, 2011 –
Aug 5, 2011
Rule 201

Aug 8, 2011 –
Aug 12, 2011
US credit downgrade

41.2
37.0
307.0

814.1
385.0
2,744.0

199.0
88.0
2,992.0

73.6
55.0
709.0

681.8
303.0
2,275.0

Monthly trigger rate for each stock
Mean
Median
Maximum

0.37
0.13
9.0

4.23
4.29
18.6

1.3
0.8
12.0

0.69
0.40
9.8

5.5
4.3
21.4

Consecutive triggers
New trigger
Trigger on 2nd consecutive day
Trigger on >=3 consecutive days

36.3
4.48
1.42

653.8
134.1
26.3

162.7
30.1
10.0

64.4
8.61
1.42

585.8
85.6
10.4

Period:

2005-2006

Applicable Rule
Panel A: Stocks that decline 10%
Average daily number of stocks
Mean
Median
Maximum
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Table 2-continued
Sept 2008 –
Oct 2008

Aug 2009 –
Feb 25, 2011

Feb 28, 2011 –
Aug 5, 2011

Aug 8, 2011 –
Aug 12, 2011

Applicable Rule
Uptick rule
Panel B: Classification of stocks that decline 10%
Low price stocks
33.1
Medium priced stocks
5.01
High price stocks
3.53

Short ban

No restriction

Rule 201

US credit downgrade

494.7
213.3
106.2

153.6
32.1
16.2

64.0
7.14
3.93

464.0
143.2
74.6

Small-cap stocks
38.1
Medium-cap stocks
2.97
Large-cap stocks
1.65
Panel C: Classification of stocks that decline 5%
Low price stocks
124.0
Medium priced stocks
71.1
High price stocks
28.1

620.1
134.9
68.2

166.0
25.2
15.4

65.6
7.28
2.34

537.0
108.8
60.0

893.6
834.9
318.8

495.4
200.4
48.4

276.3
84.9
34.5

875.8
674.4
287.6

Small-cap stocks
198.8
Medium-cap stocks
18.6
Large-cap stocks
6.35
Panel D: Classification of stocks that decline 15%
Low price stocks
9.34
Medium priced stocks
3.72
High price stocks
2.08

1469.9
373.7
203.7

582.4
115.1
48.7

331.4
50.5
14.3

1324.4
346.8
166.6

206.7
108.8
34.7

59.2
12.41
3.95

20.86
3.86
2.18

148.8
54.0
10.60

Small-cap stocks
Medium-cap stocks
Large-cap stocks

277.7
48.1
27.6

63.3
9.92
8.10

22.72
2.97
1.63

183.8
25.60
6.67

Period:

2005-2006

13.42
1.72
1.25
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that period, as many as 2,744 stocks declined by over 10%. For stocks that declined
repetitively, we also compute the number of times that they decline 10% respectively
within a given period. During the short selling ban period, a stock on average has a 10%
intraday decline more than 4 times a month. We also report the number of stocks per day
that decline 10% once in consecutive days, number of stocks that decline 10% on 2
consecutive days, and number of stocks that decline 10% on 3 or more consecutive days.
In Table 2, Panel B, we sub-divide stocks into categories based on price and
market capitalization. For each day, we make deciles of stocks based on stock prices.
Following Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2010), we categorize the bottom three
deciles as low-priced stocks, the middle four deciles as medium priced stocks, and the top
three deciles as high price stocks. We find that on average about 75% of the stocks that
have a 10% decline are low priced, although they constitute only 30% of our sample. For
example, in the Rule 201 period, an average of 64 low-priced stocks are triggered each
day in comparison to 4 high-priced stocks. We similarly define small-, medium-, and
large-cap stocks based on market capitalization deciles formed at the beginning of each
year. During Rule 201 period, we find that an average of 66 small-cap stocks get
triggered each day compared to only 2 large-cap stocks. On the other hand, short sellers
target high-priced, large-cap stocks that are easier to borrow. Thus, a short selling
restriction targeted for stocks that decline 10% irrespective of their price or size tends to
affect low-priced and small-cap stocks disproportionately. Thus, many of our proposed
alternatives take these firm-characteristics into account to make the restrictions more
meaningful. In Table 2, Panel C, we repeat the analysis by assuming a hypothetical rule
that gets triggered after a 5% intraday decline. We find during Rule 201 period, 276 low-
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priced stocks have a trigger of this hypothetical rule compared to 35 high-priced stocks.
Similarly, in Table 2, Panel D, we assume a hypothetical rule that gets triggered after a
15% intraday decline. About 2 high-priced stocks are triggered by this hypothetical rule
compared to 21 low-priced stocks during Rule 201 period. Thus, we find that changing
the trigger condition from 10% to 5% or 20% still results in a high trigger rate for lowpriced stocks, while we aim to have a comparable trigger rate for high-priced stocks, in
which short sellers are more active. A trigger condition of 15% decline for low-priced
stocks and a trigger condition of 5% decline serves our purpose better. More high-priced
stocks are affected by this rule compared to low-priced stocks. For example, with this
new rule, about 34 high-price stocks will be affected compared to 21 low-priced stocks
during Rule period.
4.3 Short selling activity for different return groups
For each stock on each day, we compute relative short selling (relss) as short
selling volume divided by total trading volume on day t, where t is the day on which we
form the portfolios of the three intraday low return groups. For stock-days with missing
short selling data, if the stock appears in the data on at least 1 day during the sample
period, we assign a short volume of 0 to that stock. Otherwise, we drop that stock.
We separately analyze the uptick rule period (Panel A), the ban period (Panel B),
the no tick period (Panel C), the Rule 201 period (Panel D), and the U.S. credit
downgrade period (Panel E). For each return group, we present the difference between
relative short selling on day t and day t-1 to assess the relationship between short selling
and intensity of contemporaneous intraday returns. We find that relative short selling is
particularly lower on day t as compared to day t-1 in Rule 201’s target stocks even during
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the no tick restriction period. The average difference between relative short selling on day
t and day t-1 for target stocks is -1.05% during the no-tick restriction period. These
differences indicate that short volume usually declines on its own for the stocks that the
current regulation targets. In contrast, relative short selling increases for the group with
intraday low return > 0%. Therefore, we do not see any evidence that an increase in short
selling exacerbates a price decline after the stock price has already dropped significantly.
We find a similar pattern of short selling activity when we divide these periods into subperiods of up and down days based on market return.

Table 3
Variations in short selling volume based on regulatory regimes
During each short selling restriction regime, we classify stock days into 4 return groups:
(i) Intraday low return <= -10%; (ii) Intraday low return <= -5%; (iii) Intraday low return
<= -15%; (iv) 0% < Intraday low return. For each stock day, we compute the difference
between relative short selling on day t and relative short selling on day t-1. In each panel,
we present the overall mean and the mean for positive and negative days separately.

Return groups:
Panel A: Uptick rule
Overall
Negative return days
Positive return days
Panel B: Ban period
Overall
Negative return days
Positive return days
Panel C: No tick
restrictions
Overall
Negative return days
Positive return days

Short selling on day t - Short selling on day t-1
Intraday low return
<= -10%
<= -5%
<= -15%
>= 0%
-3.30%***
-3.44%***
-3.15%***

-2.55%***
-2.69%***
-2.37%***

-3.53%***
-3.59%***
-3.47%***

2.97%***
3.50%***
2.74%***

-1.34%***
-1.39%***
-0.46%

-0.51%***
-0.69%***
0.97%*

-1.78%***
-1.80%***
-1.37%

0.47%
0.12%
0.60%

-1.05%***
-1.62%***
-0.34%

-1.06%***
-1.24%***
-0.79%***

-0.44%
-1.28%***
0.50%

1.95%***
3.20%***
1.57%***
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Table 3-continued
Short selling on day t - Short selling on day t-1
Intraday low return
<= -10%
<= -5%
<= -15%
>= 0%

Return groups:
Panel D: Rule 201
Overall
-4.49%***
-2.16%***
-4.35%***
Negative return days
-4.57%***
-2.38%***
-4.66%***
Positive return days
-4.34%***
-1.68%***
-3.86%***
Panel E: US credit
downgrade
Overall
-2.98%***
0.40%*
-4.92%***
Negative return days
-2.39%***
1.59%***
-3.95%***
Positive return days
-6.20%***
-3.87%***
-8.89%***
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

1.84%***
3.18%***
1.35%***

1.62%***
6.51%***
1.14%***

On market down days, the average difference between relative short selling on
day t and day t-1 is -1.62% during no tick restriction period, which is even lower than the
difference for overall days. On market up days, the same difference is -0.34% for this
period. Thus, the current regulation kicks in a bit too late. A more effective alternative
regulation would take into account a stock’s recent return but would the cut-off point
would be well before a stock has declined 10% for large high priced stocks. A 5% cut-off
appears more appropriate for large high priced stocks whereas a 15% cut-off could be
more appropriate the more volatile low priced small stocks.
4.4 Simulation of short-selling orders during the bear, normal, and bull periods
Since policymakers have frequently tightened (relaxed) the rules after a
significant market crash (prolonged bull runs) it is a reasonable premise that a rule might
be considered effective if short-sellers are effectively restricted (unrestricted) during
periods of steep declines (increases) in stock prices. We seek to determine whether Rule
201 and other alternative rules would have been binding on short-sellers during the

83

historic financial the crisis from September 2008 through October 2008. We compare this
crisis period with a bull period from March through April 2009 and a normal period from
September through October 2009. The cumulative return on S&P500 index for our bear,
bull, and normal periods were -24.5%, 18.7%, and 1.5% respectively. We begin by
simulating short-sale orders that comply with Rule 201 during these three periods. For
bear and bull periods, we simulate short sale orders on days of negative and positive
returns in these periods respectively. If Rule 201 would have been effective and binding
during the crisis, it should prevent a large proportion of our simulated short-sale orders
from executing after a substantial percentage price decline. However, the rule would be
detrimental if it unnecessarily restricts fundamentals based short selling during our
benchmark period. The best rule in our opinion is the one that balances panic prevention
during a bear against the price efficiency benefits of short selling during bull and normal
periods. To assess the “bindingness” of Rule 201, we compute the rule-compliant
execution rate for simulated short-sale orders during 1 minute period and 5 minute period
after order submission using the procedure described below.
In Table 4, Panel A, for each stock for each day on which a stock declines by 10%
price on a day or on the previous day, we simulate a round-lot short-sale order at every 5minute interval. For example, if the 10% decline happens at 10:35 am, then the first order
is placed at 10:35 am, the second order is placed at 10:40, and the last order is placed at
3:55 pm. We also simulate short sale orders starting at 9:30 am for the entire day
following the 10% decline in line with the current regulation. All simulated short-sale
orders in Panel A.(i) adhere to Rule 201 with respect to their limit price in relation to the
NBBO. For example, if the market is at $20.00 bid and to $20.05 offered for a stock at
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the time of submission of the simulated short-sale order, then we assign a limit price of
$20.01 to this order. Any trade at or above $20.01 after this order submission results in
the execution of this simulated short-sale order. The short-sale order can be executed at a
price less than or equal to the current national best bid provided that, at the time the order
was initially placed by the trading center it was permissibly priced. Also, if the bid
changes from $20.00 to $20.01 or above in the TAQ data, we assume that the simulated
short-sale order has been executed.
We present the rule-compliant execution rates of these simulated short-sale orders
within next 1-minute interval and next 5-minute interval. We compute these numbers
separately for bear, normal, and bull periods in columns 2, column 3, and column 4,
respectively. In column 5, the difference between cumulative execution rates during the
bear period and the bull period is reported. In Panel A.(i), we find that even in the
presence of Rule 201, more than half of these simulated orders (59.3%) are executed
within 5 minutes of order placement during the crisis period of 2008. Thus, the current
regulation is not particularly binding on short-selling activity in stocks with serious price
declines. Moreover, the cumulative fill rate of 47.6% during the crisis period is much
higher than the cumulative fill rate of 47.6% during the bull period. Thus, the current rule
does not appear to have the desirable effect of reducing short selling during a crisis. In
the last column of Table 4, we present the difference in the cumulative percentage of
executed short-sale orders between the bear period and the bull period. Thus, the rule
seems to be more binding during bull when it is not needed. In other words, in times of
high volatility and potential crisis, this rule seems ineffective in curtailing short-selling
activity.
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Table 4
Simulation of short-sale orders during bear, normal, and bull periods
For the periods September–October 2008 (bear), March–April 2009 (bull), and
September–October 2009 (normal), we first identify days with a 5%, 10%, and 15% stock
price decline. In Panel A, for each stock day, we simulate short-sale orders at 5-minute
intervals after the exact time of 10% decline. We also simulate such short sale orders for
the following day of 10% decline as the current Rule 201 regulation applies for 2 days
including the day of 10% decline. In Panel A.i, we present the hypothetical Rule 201compliant execution rates of these short-sale orders in the next 1-minute interval and next
5-minute interval. We compute these numbers separately for bear, normal, and bull
periods in columns 2, column 3, and column 4, respectively. In column 5, the difference
between execution rates during the bear period and the bull period is reported. In Panel
A.ii, we replicate the analysis assuming a hypothetical downtick rule that is applicable
after a stock’s price declines 10%. In Panel A.iii, we present rule-compliant execution
rates analogous to Panel B, except that these rates are calculated for a strict uptick rule. In
Panel A.iv, we replicate the analysis assuming a rule that states that a stock can only be
shorted at a price higher than or equal to 90% of previous day’s closing price. On the day
following 10% decline, the stock can be shorted only at a price higher than or equal to
previous day’s closing price. In Panel B, we apply rules analogous to 4 rules in Panel A,
but with different price triggers. For a stock that has a previous day’s closing price less
than $10, we apply these rules after an intraday decline of 15%. For a stock that has a
previous day’s closing price between $10 and $30, we apply these rules after a 10%
decline. For rest of the stocks, we apply these rules after an intraday decline of 5%. In
Panel C, we apply rules analogous to 4 rules in Panel A to stocks that have an abnormally
high level of short interest. We compute mean and standard deviation of past short
interest using data from past 12 fortnights. We define abnormal short interest as a level 2
standard deviation above the mean short interest. In Panel D, we apply the rules to stocks
with abnormally high short interest on days of extreme price decline. In Panel E, we
apply the rule to all stocks on all days.
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Table 4-continued
Cumulative percentage of short sell orders executed
Time interval

Bear period
(Sept - Oct
2008)
- C1

Normal period
(Sept - Oct 2009)
- C2

Bull period
(Mar - Apr 2009)
- C3

Difference
(C1-C3)

Panel A: Rules for stocks experiencing 10% decline
A.i: Rule 201
13.67***
First 1-minute
46.0
26.5
32.3
11.71***
First 5-minutes
59.3
41.5
47.6
A.ii: Downtick rule
8.40***
First 1-minute
42.8
31.0
34.4
7.82***
First 5-minutes
54.1
41.6
46.3
A.iii: Uptick rule
14.10***
First 1-minute
28.9
12.9
14.8
15.63***
First 5-minutes
39.5
20.0
23.9
A.iv: Rule based on previous closing price
-12.92***
First 1-minute
49.0
50.9
61.9
-12.73***
First 5-minutes
51.5
53.1
64.3
Panel B: Rules with different trigger rates for stocks based on price level
B.i: Rule 201
8.58***
First 1-minute
50.7
40.8
42.2
7.23***
First 5-minutes
62.6
54.7
55.4
B.ii: Downtick rule
10.05***
First 1-minute
47.9
42.3
37.9
10.32***
First 5-minutes
59.0
52.7
48.6
B.iii: Uptick rule
15.23***
First 1-minute
36.5
26.4
21.3
17.07***
First 5-minutes
48.8
37.2
31.8
B.iv: Rule based on previous closing price
-9.56***
First 1-minute
51.7
53.3
61.2
-8.81***
First 5-minutes
54.9
55.8
63.7
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Table 4-continued
Cumulative percentage of short sell orders executed
Time interval

Bear period
(Sept - Oct
2008)
- C1

Normal period
(Sept - Oct
2009)
- C2

Bull period
(Mar - Apr
2009)
C3

Difference
(C1-C3)

Panel C: Rules for stocks with high short interest
C.i: Rule 201
-0.06
First 1-minute
54.3
33.3
54.3
0.98***
First 5-minutes
68.9
49.8
68.0
C.ii: Downtick rule
-14.83***
First 1-minute
39.7
28.0
54.6
-12.52***
First 5-minutes
54.1
39.3
66.6
C.iii: Uptick rule
-8.26***
First 1-minute
24.7
10.9
33.0
-11.29***
First 5-minutes
39.0
19.3
50.3
C.iv: Rule based on previous closing price
-30.85***
First 1-minute
37.2
47.7
68.0
-30.36***
First 5-minutes
39.6
50.4
70.0
Panel D: Rules for stocks with high short interest experiencing 5%, 10%, or 15% decline
D.i: Rule 201
2.37*
First 1-minute
56.2
38.0
53.9
3.51***
First 5-minutes
69.0
52.3
65.5
D.ii: Downtick rule
-15.62***
First 1-minute
44.0
42.7
59.6
-12.63***
First 5-minutes
57.2
52.4
69.8
D.iii: Uptick rule
-6.69***
First 1-minute
31.4
21.4
38.1
-8.02***
First 5-minutes
45.6
31.0
53.6
D.iv: Rule based on previous closing price
-23.48***
First 1-minute
24.8
25.8
48.3
-23.28***
First 5-minutes
26.6
27.0
49.8
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Table 4-continued
Cumulative percentage of short sell orders executed
Time interval

Bear period
(Sept - Oct 2008)
- C1

Normal period
(Sept - Oct
2009)
- C2

Bull period
(Mar - Apr
2009)
C3

Panel E: Rules applicable to all stocks at all times
E.i: Rule 201
First 1-minute
48.2
40.5
42.7
First 5-minutes
62.1
58.2
58.6
E.ii: Downtick rule
First 1-minute
35.9
31.2
34.5
First 5-minutes
48.1
44.1
47.1
E.iii: Uptick rule
First 1-minute
22.7
14.2
17.5
First 5-minutes
34.7
25.6
29.6
E.iv: Rule based on previous closing price
First 1-minute
37.4
52.2
66.6
First 5-minutes
39.6
54.8
68.9
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Difference
(C1-C3)

5.48***
3.54***
1.38***
1.03***
5.27***
5.16***
-29.22***
-29.33***

In Panel A.(ii), we simulate short-sell orders that comply with the downtick rule
that was in effect in the 1930s. We simulate short sell orders at every five-minute interval
at a price equal to the previous traded price. If the bid price of the existing quote is at or
above the limit price of this simulated short sell order, then we see an immediate
execution of this simulated short sell order. Otherwise, any trade at or above this price at
a later time results in execution of the simulated order. Similarly, any quote change that
increases the bid to a level at or above the price of the simulated order results in
execution. We present the rule-compliant execution rates of these simulated short-sale
orders within next 1-minute interval and next 5-minute interval. We find that the
execution of these simulated orders during bear period is 54.1% while the execution rate
during bull period is 46.3%. Like Rule 201, even this rule does not impose the desired
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restrictions during the bear periods while it unnecessarily restricts short selling during
normal and bull periods.
Next, in Table 4, Panel A.(iii), we present rule-compliant execution rates for
simulated short-sell orders that comply with a strict uptick rule, that was implemented in
1938. We simulate short sell orders at every five-minute interval at a price 1-cent higher
than previous traded price. We classify our simulated short sell order as having been
executed whenever the bid increases to the limit order price or there is a trade at the limit
order price. We believe that this rule does a better job than Rule 201 in curtailing short
selling during the bear period, but it also restricts short selling during bull and normal
periods. The execution rate of the uptick rule during the crisis period is 39.5% in the first
5-minutes compared to the 59.3% execution rate of Rule 201. At the same time, the
execution rate during the bull period is also lower at 23.9%, compared to 47.6%
execution rate of Rule 201.
In Table 4, Panel A.(iv), we simulate short sell orders that comply with a short
selling rule that is based on the previous day’s closing price. Such rules have been used
internationally by exchanges such as the Taiwan Stock Exchange. If a stock’s price
declines by 10% on a given day, thereafter, short sellers are not allowed to short sell the
stock at a price lower than 90% of previous day’s closing price. If the bid price of the
current quote is at or above this trigger price, there is an immediate execution of the
order. Otherwise, the short seller has to submit a limit order at a price equal to 90% of the
previous day’s closing price. On the following day of 10% decline, this rule restricts short
selling a price lower than previous day’s closing price. During a bear period, 51.5% of
the orders are filled in compliance with this rule during a bear period. In contrast, during
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bull period when restrictions are not necessary, 64.3% of simulated short orders are filled.
Although, an execution rate of 54.9% during bear period is still high, but this rule appears
to be more promising in striking the right balance between panic prevention during a bear
period and the price efficiency benefits of short selling during normal and bull periods.
In Table 4, Panel B, we apply rules analogous to the 4 rules in Panel A, but with
different price triggers based on previous day’s closing price. For a stock that has a
previous day’s closing price less than $10, we apply these rules after an intraday decline
of 15%. For a stock that has a previous day’s closing price between $10 and $30, we
apply these rules after a 10% decline. For stocks that have a previous day’s closing price
higher than $30, we apply these rules after an intraday decline of 5%. Although we find
that modified version of Rule 201, downtick rule, and uptick rule still restrict short selling
more during bull period, modified version of our rule based on previous day’s closing
price has a much lower execution rate of 54.9% during bear period compared to a 63.7%
execution rate during bull period.
In Table 4, Panel C, we apply rules analogous to the 4 rules in Panel A but this
time stocks that have an abnormally high level of short interest are triggered. We use
short interest ratio defined as number of shares shorted divided by float. For bear period
of 2008, we apply the rules to stocks that had a high level of short interest ratio before the
naked short sell ban in July 2008 and study the ban period separately. For normal and
bull period of 2009, we apply the rules to stocks that had a high level of short interest at
the beginning of the respective periods. For each stock, we compute the mean level of
short interest and standard deviation of short interest using short interest of past 12
fortnights. Our simulated rule places short selling restrictions on each stock for which
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short interest is two standard deviation above the mean level of short interest. All rules
except current Rule 201 restrict short selling more during the bear period than in the bull
period. Thus, we have identified several potential alternatives to the current regulation
that can help achieve the goals of a price efficient and manipulation resistant market
structure. In particular, our proposed rule based on previous closing price has a very low
execution rate of 39.6% during bear period compared to a high execution rate of 70.0%
during the bull period.
So far we have looked at trigger conditions that are based on a single variable
such as price or short interest. Now we interact these variables in our search for an
optimal rule. In Table 4, Panel D, we apply rules analogous to the 4 rules in Panel A to
stocks based on a dual condition involving both a significant decline of 5%, 10%, or 15%
and a high level of short interest. A high level of short interest also in itself could indicate
that the stock is overpriced as short sellers are generally contrarians and tend to sell after
price increases. But a high level of short interest accompanied by significant price
declines can indicate price manipulation. That is what a good regulation should avoid.
Thus, we want to especially focus on this trigger condition in this panel. Among the four
trading rule variations, the proposed rule that restricts short selling below previous day’s
closing price has the best combination of one of the lowest execution rates of 26.6% in
the crisis period and a reasonably high execution rate of 49.8% in the bull markets.
In Table 4, Panel E, we apply rules analogous to the 4 trading rules in Panel A for
the full sample at all times without specifying any ex-ante trigger conditions. Because of
high computational requirement for running simulation for each stock-day, we limit our
simulation to randomly selected 1000 stocks. At the beginning of each period, we form
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deciles of stocks based on the current price level, which is a proxy for volatility. We
randomly choose 100 stocks from each decile and run the simulation for these 1000
stocks. All rules except the rule based on previous closing price, restrict short selling
more during the bull period compared to bear periods. For the rule based on previous
closing price, the execution rate is still lower at 39.6% during the bear period compared
to a high execution rate of 68.9% during the bull period. Thus, the proposed trading rule
that restricts short selling below previous day’s closing price appears to be very effective
in balancing the short selling activity during bear and bull markets.
In the overall analysis, we find that the alternative rule conditioned on stock’s
previous closing price and applicable for stocks with high short interest offer a much
better solution than the current regulation in balancing crisis prevention and price
efficiency. In particular, this rule restricts short selling even more when it is applied to
stocks with extreme price declines. The execution rate goes down from 39.6% to 26.6%
when we run the simulation for stocks with high short interest on days of extreme price
declines.
4.5 Probit regression for execution of shot selling orders
We run probit regression with execution as dependent variable, which takes a
value of 1 if the simulated sell order executes in 5 minutes; otherwise 0. Our explanatory
variables are a dummy variable for bear period, a dummy variable bull period, stock’s
contemporaneous return, contemporaneous stock volatility, past stock volatility,
contemporaneous stock turnover, trading volume, and relative spread. Our optimal rule
should have a negative coefficient for bear period and a positive coefficient for bull
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Table 5
Probit regression for simulated short sell order execution
We run probit regression with execution as dependent variable, which takes a value of 1 if the simulated sell order executes in
5 minutes; otherwise 0. Our explanatory variables are a dummy variable for bear period, a dummy variable bull period,
contemporaneous stock volatility, trading volume, and relative spread. In model 1, we run the regression for current Rule 201,
which restricts short selling at bid price after a 10% intraday decline. In models 2-5, we run the regression for a rule based on
previous closing price. The trigger condition for model 2 is 10% decline. The trigger condition for model 3 is 5%, 10%, or
15% decline dependent on the price level of stock. In model 4, the rule triggers for stocks with high short interest. In model 5,
the trigger condition is an extreme decline of 5%, 10%, or 15% for stocks with high short interest level.
Dependent variable: Simulated short sell order execution (0 or 1)
Rule based on previous closing price and
Rule 201
Short interest and declines
10% trigger 5%,10% or 15% trigger Short interest
Intercept
-0.0648***
0.2495***
0.1307***
0.1343***
-1.6044***
Bear period
0.4310***
-0.0629***
-0.0394***
-0.2446***
0.4211***
Bull period
0.1791***
0.3611***
0.3837***
0.5671***
0.3035***
volatility
-0.5415***
-1.3063***
-1.0151***
-1.4601***
1.4904***
trading volume
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***
0.0000***
relative spread
-2.8196***
-0.8666***
0.3257***
-1.3697***
0.3881***
*** represents significance at 1%.

period. In model 1, we run the regression for Rule 201. In models 2-5, we run the regression for a rule based on previous
closing price. The trigger condition for model 2 is 10% decline. The trigger condition for model 3 is 5%, 10%, or 15% decline
dependent on the price level of stock. In model 4, the rule triggers for stocks with high short interest. In model 5, the trigger
condition is an extreme decline of 5%, 10%, or 15% for stocks with high short interest level.
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We find that current Rule 201 causes an increase in execution rate during the bear
period, and the execution rate declines during bull period. For models 2-4, we find that
during bear period, execution rate goes down. A short selling rule restricting short selling
based on high level of short interest is the most optimal in restricting short selling during
bear periods. Next, to verify the price efficiency aspects of optimally restricted short
selling, we perform some direct test in the next section.
4.6 Price efficiency
We compute price discovery measure for stocks that decline 10% during uptick
rule, no tick restriction period, and Rule 201 period. Following Boehmer and Kelley
(2009), price efficiency is the absolute value of quote midpoint return autocorrelations.
The intuition is that if the quote midpoint is the market’s best estimate of the equilibrium
value of the stock at any point in time, efficient prices will imply that quote midpoints
follow a random walk. Therefore, quote midpoints should exhibit less autocorrelation in
either direction. To estimate quote midpoint return autocorrelations, we choose a 5minute interval. We define |AR5| as the absolute value of quote midpoint return
autocorrelations at 5-minute frequency. A smaller absolute value of autocorrelation
indicates greater price efficiency. For each stock-day with an intraday decline of 10% or
more, we compute this measure for 1-day before and 1-day after the decline.
We only consider those stock days that have a fresh trigger of the rule instead of a
mere continuation from the previous day. On a day prior to 10% decline, the current rule
is not applicable and on the day following 10% decline, current rule is applicable for the
entire day. By comparing the differences in these measures for day t-1 and t+1, we find
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that although there is an improvement in price efficiency during no tick restriction period,
but this measure remains unchanged after a 10% decline during both uptick rule and Rule
201 periods.

Table 6
Price discovery in different short selling regimes
We compute price discovery measure for stocks that decline 10% during uptick rule
period, no tick restriction period, and Rule 201 period. Following Boehmer and Kelley
(2009), we use autocorrelation of quote-midpoint returns as a measure of price efficiency.
To estimate quote midpoint return autocorrelations, we choose a 5-minute interval. |AR5|
is the absolute value of quote midpoint return autocorrelations. A smaller absolute value
of autocorrelation indicates greater price efficiency. For each stock-day with an intraday
decline of 10% or more, we compute this measure for 1-day before and 1-day after the
decline.
1-day before
1-day after
Observations
Panel A: Uptick rule (February 1, 2007 to March 31, 2007)
|AR5|
843
0.3003
0.2884
Panel B: No tick restriction (February 1, 2011 to February 27, 2011)
|AR5|
605
0.1394
0.1276
Panel C: After Rule 201 (February 28, 2011 to March 31, 2011)
|AR5|
958
0.1335
0.1307
* represents significance at 10%.

Diff
-0.0119
-0.0118*
-0.0028

4.7 Return characteristics during different short selling restriction periods
During each short selling restriction period, we calculate the market-adjusted
returns for each intraday low return group. We present contemporaneous closing return,
next day opening return, and next day closing return in column 2 to 4. We compute
cumulative return during next 2 days and next 5 days, and present them in column 5 and
6. We find that stocks that experience a 10% decline recover most during no tick
restriction period. For example, stocks in group intraday low return < -10%, experience a
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Table 7
Price recovery in different short selling restriction periods
During each short selling restriction period, we divide stock days in 3 different return groups: (1) Intraday low return <= -10%;
(2) -10% < Intraday low return <= 0%; and (3) Intraday low return > 0%. For each stock day, we calculate market-adjusted
returns for each intraday low return group. We present the average contemporaneous closing return, next day opening return,
and next day closing return in columns 2 through 4. We compute market-adjusted cumulative return during next 2 days and
next 5 days, and present them in column 5 and 6.
Return characteristics:
Panel A: Uptick rule
Intraday low return <= -10%
-10% < Intraday low return < 0%
Intraday low return >= 0%
Panel B: Ban period
Intraday low return <= -10%
-10% < Intraday low return < 0%
Intraday low return >= 0%
Panel C: No tick restrictions
Intraday low return <= -10%
-10% < Intraday low return < 0%
Intraday low return >= 0%
Panel D: Rule 201
Intraday low return <= -10%
-10% < Intraday low return < 0%
Intraday low return >= 0%

Contemporaneous
Return

Next day return
(opening)

Next day return
(closing)

Future return
(next 2 days)

Future return
(next 5 days)

-9.17
-0.30
2.82

0.30
0.03
0.09

0.79
0.03
0.06

1.22
0.07
0.08

2.18
0.16
0.16

-8.93
-0.99
6.31

0.63
-0.11
-0.03

-0.20
-0.31
0.46

-0.82
-0.42
-0.07

0.93
-1.73
-0.76

-8.71
-0.28
4.24

0.82
0.09
0.09

1.29
0.07
0.08

2.10
0.14
0.16

3.37
0.36
0.48

-9.08
-0.48
2.34

0.38
0.00
0.08

-0.46
-0.02
0.07

-0.77
-0.05
0.15

0.25
-0.13
0.14
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next-day closing return of 1.29% and next 2-day cumulative return of 2.10%. The future
returns of the stocks in this group remain negative during Rule 201 period. They
experience a next-day closing return of -0.46% and next 2-day cumulative return of 0.77% during Rule 201 period. The contemporaneous closing return of the stocks in this
group is -9.08% during Rule 201 and is lower than a contemporaneous closing return of 8.71 during no tick restriction period. Stocks from the same group suffer a decline during
the next 1-day and next 2-day, instead of a price recovery, during the ban period as well.
5. Conclusion
The SEC repealed uptick restrictions on short selling in 2007, reversed course in
2008 by temporarily banning short selling in 2008, and approved Rule 201 in 2010-2011
to restrict short selling in stocks that have an intraday decline of 10% or more. The SEC’s
goal is to stabilize the market by preventing potentially manipulative, abusive, or panicdriven short selling. Regulators around the world have a history of restricting short sellers
after market declines and removing such restrictions after prolonged bull runs. This
vacillating approach indicates that regulators recognize the benefits of short selling in
providing additional liquidity and price efficiency during normal periods but are more
concerned about its adverse effects during market declines. We compare the current
regulations with several other alternatives to find optimum level of short selling
restriction that could strike a good balance between panic preventions motives and
market efficiency.
We test the effectiveness of various regulatory alternatives during bear, normal,
and bull markets. We find that although the current Rule affects a few stocks on an
average day, but during bear periods such as financial crisis, flash crash, or US credit
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downgrade, a high number of stocks are affected by the Rule. The Rule affects the stocks
in a disproportionate manner, in that it affects a large number of low-priced, small-cap
stocks. We propose a new trigger condition based on stock’s current price level. A new
rule that has a trigger condition of 5% decline for high-priced stocks, 10% decline for
medium-priced stocks, and 15% decline for low-priced stocks, results in a more properly
aligned distribution of triggered stocks in different price categories.
We simulate short sell orders during bear, normal, and bull markets. We find that
the current regulation would not have been binding on short sellers during the 2008 crisis
as the simulated orders executed at a very high rate. We repeat this analysis by simulating
short sell orders that comply with the uptick and downtick rule, and short selling rules
used by international exchanges. We simulate short selling using 20 new rules that have a
different trigger condition based on stock’s previous closing price, rules that are
applicable for stocks with high short interest, and rules that are applicable for all stocks
on all days. We find that compared to other rules a short selling rule with a modified
trigger condition for stocks with high short interest and placing restriction based on
previous closing price prevents more short selling during crisis periods without unduly
limiting short selling in normal and bull periods.
By comparing the differences in the price efficiency 1-day before and 1-day after
10% decline, we find that although there is an improvement in price efficiency during no
tick restriction period, but this measure remains unchanged after a 10% decline during
both uptick rule and Rule 201 periods. We also find that the target stocks recover most in
the absence of any tick restriction and conclude that Rule 201 does not have a favorable
impact on the valuation dynamics for the targeted stocks.
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Overall, we find that but the regulatory framework concerning short selling can be
meaningfully modified in terms of the trigger return by taking into account a stock’s
price, volatility, and size. One alternatives regulation based on previous day’s closing
price performs better at striking a balance between preventing price manipulation and
promoting price efficiency.
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Chapter 5
Short Selling Activity outside Regular Trading Hours
1. Introduction
Several studies have examined short selling behavior around earnings
announcement days (Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004), Engelberg, Reed, and
Ringgenberg (2012), Blau and Pinegar (2009), Zheng (2009), Berkman and McKenzie
(2010), and Daske, Richardson, and Tuna (2005)). Interestingly, the existing literature
provides mixed evidence on the role of short sellers around earnings announcement.
While Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) find that short sellers have private information
and trade prior to earnings announcements, Daske, Richardson, and Tuna (2005) find no
evidence to support this conclusion.
Previous studies on short selling during earnings announcement days have only
examined short selling aggregated at a daily level. Jiang, Likitapiwat, and McInish (2012)
find that on days of earnings announcement, significant portion of the price change and
price discovery occurs immediately after the earnings releases during before market open
or after market close sessions. Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts (2006) report that 73% of
quarterly earnings announcements occurs outside normal trading hours. For our sample of
stocks, more than 85% of earnings announcements are made outside of regular trading
hours (RTH). We focus our analysis on these earnings announcements made during
before market open (BMO) and after market close (AMC) sessions of the day. We add to
the existing literature by studying behavior of short sellers immediately after the earnings
announcement.
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We collect earnings announcements made outside of RTH along with the exact
time-stamp for all exchange-listed firms for a period from January 2005 to January 2007.
We address three aspects of short selling following after-hours earnings announcements.
First, we present fresh evidence concerning the short selling activity on earnings
announcement days during after-hours trading (AHT), such as short selling volume, and
number of short trades. We believe that we are the first to study short selling activity
during AHT. Our results show that there is significant amount of short selling activity
following earnings announcements. We find evidence of short selling activity during
BMO session on 29% of BMO announcement days. Similarly, we find evidence of short
selling during AMC session on 72% AMC announcement days. These numbers increase to
40% and 96% for top 250 stocks by trading volume. For these active stocks, short selling
accounts for $1,477,000 and $10,256,000 of trading volume during BMO and AMC
sessions on earnings announcement days, respectively.
Second, we provide evidence on profitability of short trades during AHT.
Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) find that the trading advantage of short sellers
comes from their ability to analyze public information. We analyze the profitability of
short sales trades that take place immediately after the earnings announcement. While the
past literature measures profitability of short sellers using the performance of a stock’s
price after aggregating short selling activity at a daily level, we use actual price of each
short sale trade to compute profitability of short sellers. We find that on announcement
days with negative surprise, short sellers make a profit of 0.46% and 2.03% during BMO
and AMC sessions, respectively. For AMC announcements, the magnitude of these profits
increase with increase in short selling volume.
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Finally, we find evidence that short selling contributes to more efficient opening
prices. If short sellers have a better ability to analyze information after public release of
earnings announcement, a higher short selling activity will result in a more efficient
opening price. We find that on earnings announcement days with no short selling,
opening prices are less efficient compared to opening prices following earnings
announcement days with short selling. For earnings announcement days with short selling,
the opening prices become more efficient with the increase in short selling volume.
2. Related literature
Our paper relates to two distinct branches of literature. First, we relate our study
to an extensive literature on the informativeness of short sellers and their trading behavior
around news events. Second, our paper contributes to a growing literature on after-hours
trading.
2.1 Short selling and information
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) find that short sellers possess important
information and are important contributors to efficient stock prices. Dechow et al. (2001)
also find that short sellers target companies that are overpriced based on fundamental
ratios such as price-to-earnings ratio and market-to-book ratio.
Several papers find that short sellers can anticipate negative news and trade before
announcement of the news. Karpoff and Lou (2010), examine short sellers’ positions in
firms that are investigated for financial misconduct and find that short sellers generally
anticipate public announcements of investigations. Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004)
and Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) focus on short sellers’ trades around earnings
announcements and analyst downgrades, respectively. They find evidence that short
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sellers are informed traders who can profit from these events. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang
(2010) look at short selling around management forecast announcements and earnings
announcements and find some evidence that short sellers anticipate these announcements
and a significant fraction of their information advantage comes from trading around these
events.
Another stream of literature finds that short sellers do not possess private
information and they react to news announcements. Using a database of short sales
combined with a database of news releases, Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012)
find that a substantial portion of short sellers’ trading advantage comes from their ability
to analyze publicly available information. Daske, Richardson, and Tuna (2005) find no
evidence that short sale transactions concentrate prior to bad news events. Berkman and
McKenzie (2010) also find that short sellers decrease their positions prior to earnings
announcements, and increase their positions in the post-announcement period. They find
that aggressive trading by short sellers in reaction to earnings releases enhances
immediate price discovery. Boehmer and Wu (2010) find that short sellers contribute to
price discovery after negative surprise earnings announcement and with more shorting,
post-earnings announcement drift vanishes. Blau and Pinegar (2009) and Zheng (2009)
also find that short sellers react to rather than anticipate the news in earnings
announcements and short selling activity increases following both negative and positive
earnings surprises.
2.2 After-hours trading
Barclay and Hendershott (2003) find that even though trading volume is lower
during after hours, it can generate significant price discovery. Barclay and Hendershott
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(2008) find that as Nasdaq pre-open trading volume increased, the opening price became
more efficient and price discovery shifted from the opening trade to the pre-open. Cao,
Ghysels, and Hathaway (2000) study preopening quotes as signaling for price discovery
on the NASDAQ. They find that the contribution of the pre-opening period, as measured
on a relative unit time basis, is as large as that of the trading period.
Jiang, Likitapiwat, and McInish (2012) study the effect of after-hours trading
following earnings announcement release outside of the normal trading hours. They find
that a significant portion of price discovery happens during the before market open
(BMO) and after market close (AMC) sessions. Thus, trading outside normal trading
hours plays an important role for the price discovery in the stock markets. McInish, Van
Ness, and Van Ness (2002) study the AHT of NYSE-listed stocks on regional exchanges.
They find that the stocks that are traded most actively during RTH are traded actively
during AHT also. Francis, Pagach and Stephan (1992) investigate market responses to
overnight and daytime announcements of U.S. firms and focus on volume and price
reaction at the open of the market following overnight announcements. Greene and Watts
(1996) report that stocks react differently to earnings announcements made during the
different time periods. For the announcements that are made during non-trading period,
price changes occur immediately when the market opens. Berkman and Truong (2009)
note that event studies of announcements typically assign the Compustat or I/B/E/S
earnings announcement date as event day 0, which is incorrect when announcements are
made after hours.
However, we are not aware of any study of after-hours short selling following
announcements made outside of RTH. Previous studies focus on short selling activity on
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days prior to the earnings announcement, on the day of earnings announcement, and on
days following earnings announcement. Our research design allows us to study the
immediate behavior of short sellers in AHT.
3. Data/ descriptive statistics
The short volume dataset for the period January 2005-January 2007 is based on
reporting requirements of Regulation SHO, which was implemented in January 2005 to
reduce abusive naked short selling practices. Regulation SHO data was available for the
period from January 2005 to January 2007 on exchange websites. This is a transaction
level data for NYSE, NASDAQ, and Amex exchanges. For each stock day, we sum the
intraday short selling volume for all the exchanges and calculate the total short volume
before market open (BMO) session, during regular trading hours (RTH), and after market
close (AMC) session. We also use the quarterly earnings announcements from the
I/B/E/S dataset, which provides both the date and time of earnings releases. Table 1
presents the distribution of announcements by time of release during January 2005January 2007. In Panel A, we present the number of announcements by time and by
surprise for all exchange listed stocks. Surprise is the difference of actual earnings and
median analysts forecast for each quarter of each stock normalized by the stock price. In
column 2 and column 3, we present the number of earnings announcement with a positive
earnings surprise and negative earnings surprise, respectively. More than 85% of the
quarterly announcements are made outside of RTH (9:30 – 16:00); with about 35% in the
BMO session (7:00 - 9:30) and 37% in the AMC session (16:00 – 18:30), and 15% in the
overnight session (18:30 – 7:00). Overall, about 64% of earnings announcement in our
sample have a positive earnings surprise and rest 36% have a negative earnings
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Table 1
Number of earnings announcements, by time of day
For all exchange listed stocks, we present the distribution of quarterly earnings
announcements by time of the day from January 2005 to January 2007. We report four
times periods: before market open (BMO), 7:00 – 9:30; regular trading hours (RTH),
9:30 – 16:00; after market close (AMC), 16:00 – 18:30; and overnight (OVR), 18:30 –
7:00. We also divide each earnings announcement into positive and negative surprise
category based on analyst forecast and actual earnings per share. Surprise is the
difference of actual earnings and median analysts forecast for each quarter of each stock
normalized by the stock price. In Panel B, we report the similar analysis for top 250
stocks by volume. In Panel C, we report the similar analysis for top 250 Nasdaq stocks by
volume.
Time of announcement
Positive surprise
Negative surprise
Panel A: All stocks
7:00 - 9:30 BMO
6,139
3544
9:30 - 16:00 RTH
2090
1312
16:00 - 18:30 AMC
6,681
3,473
18:30 - 7:00 OVR
2,599
1603
Total
17,509
9,932
Panel B: Top 250 stocks by volume
7:00 - 9:30 BMO
602
261
9:30 - 16:00 RTH
123
53
16:00 - 18:30 AMC
550
147
18:30 - 7:00 OVR
214
82
Total
1,489
543
Panel C: Top 250 Nasdaq listed stocks by volume
7:00 - 9:30 BMO
294
149
9:30 - 16:00 RTH
136
56
16:00 - 18:30 AMC
844
270
18:30 - 7:00 OVR
123
77
Total
1,397
552

Total
9,683
3,402
10,154
4,202
27,441
863
176
697
296
2,032
443
192
1,114
200
1,949

surprise. In Panel B, we present these numbers for a subset of top 250 stocks by trading
volume during our sample period. In Panel C, we present these numbers for a subset of
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top 250 NASDAQ-listed stocks by trading volume. We download trading volume,
opening price, closing price, market capitalization, and primary exchange from CRSP.
Next, we merge the Regulation SHO data and I/B/E/S data and look at the short
selling activity during the earnings announcement days. In Table 2 Panel A, we report the
results for all exchange listed stocks. We report the results separately for earnings
announcement days and non-announcement days during BMO and AMC sessions. We
also present results for earnings announcement days and non-announcement days when
there was short selling by excluding days of no short selling. In column 4 and column 5,
we report the mean and median dollar short selling volume. In column 6 and column 7,
we report the mean and median numbers of short trades. In column 8 and column 9, we
report the mean median of proportional dollar short selling volume which is calculated as
dollar short selling during BMO/AMC sessions divided by dollar short selling volume
during RTH session. In column 10 and column 11, we report the mean and median of
proportional short selling trades which is calculated as short selling trades during
BMO/AMC sessions divided by short selling trades during RTH session. We see
significant amount of short selling outside the regular trading hours on earnings
announcement days. We find evidence of short selling activity during BMO session on 29%
of BMO announcement days. Similarly, we find evidence of short selling during AMC
session on 72% AMC announcement days. These numbers increase to 40% and 96% for
top 250 stocks by trading volume. On earnings announcement days with short selling,
average short selling is $513,000 and average number of short trades is 29 during the
BMO session. Similarly, during the AMO session average short selling is $1,380,000 and
average number of short trades is 61. In Table 2 Panel B, we report similar results for top
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Using the short-sale transaction files from the Regulation SHO and earnings announcements from the I/B/E/S dataset, we report the
descriptive statistics of short selling activity in this table. We report the average short selling for the before market open (BMO)
session and after market close (AMC) session during the following four categories; all earnings announcement days, earnings
announcement days when short selling occur, all non earnings announcement days, non earnings announcement days when short
selling occur. In column 4 (5), we report the mean (median) dollar short selling volume. In column 6 (7), we report the mean
(median) numbers of short trades. In column 8 (9), we report the mean (median) of proportional dollar short selling volume which is
calculated as dollar short selling during BMO/AMC sessions divided by dollar short selling volume during RTH session. In column
10 (11), we report the mean (median) of proportional short selling trades which is calculated as short selling trades during
BMO/AMC sessions divided by short selling trades during RTH session. In Panel B, we report the similar analysis for top 250 stocks
by volume. In Panel C, we report the similar analysis for top 250 Nasdaq stocks by volume.
Short selling
Number of short
Proportional short Proportional short
volume (in '000)
trades
selling volume
selling trades
N
Mean Median
Mean Median
Mean
Median Mean Median
Panel A: All stocks
BMO Announcement days
9040
149
0
8.46
0
0.76%
0.0%
0.75%
0.0%
Announcement days with
short selling
2619
513
27
29.19
5
2.63%
0.65%
2.59%
0.85%
Non-Announcement days
1900188
26
0
0.88
0.0
0.69%
0.0%
0.35%
0.0%
Non-Announcement days
with short selling
191248
261
12
8.74
2
6.88%
0.58%
3.49%
0.57%
AMC Announcement days
9191
987
22
44
2.0
9.65%
1.97%
3.48%
0.78%
Announcement days with
short selling
6571 1380
68
61.5
3.0
13.50%
4.57%
4.87%
1.54%
Non-Announcement days
1900188
202
4
1.64
1.0
8.47%
0.3%
1.65%
0.2%
Non-Announcement days
366
50
2.97
2.0
15.32%
3.45%
2.97%
0.78%
with short selling
1049551
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Table 2-continued
Short selling
volume (in '000)
Mean Median

N
Panel B: Top 250 stocks by volume
BMO Announcement days
854
595
Announcement days with
short selling
344 1477
Non-Announcement days
124023
212
Non-Announcement days
with short selling
36100
728
AMC Announcement days
674 9860
Announcement days with
short selling
648 10256
Non-Announcement days
124023 1375
Non-Announcement days
with short selling
107175 1591
Panel C: Top 250 Nasdaq listed stocks by volume
BMO Announcement days
409 1269
Announcement days with
short selling
356 1458
Non-Announcement days
115088
219
Non-Announcement days
with short selling
55997
450
AMC Announcement days
1056 6726
Announcement days with
short selling
1018 6977
Non-Announcement days
115088 1080
Non-Announcement days
with short selling
102613 1211

Number of short
trades
Mean Median

Proportional short Proportional short
selling volume
selling trades
Mean
Median Mean Median

0

31.57

0

0.72%

0.0%

0.50%

0.0%

192
0

78.37
6.46

11
0

1.79%
0.36%

0.43%
0.0%

1.25%
0.15%

0.41%
0.0%

44
1165

22.19
413

5
35.5

1.23%
9.74%

0.19%
4.95%

0.53%
5.40%

0.21%
1.65%

1243
233

429.9
5.31

41.5
3.0

10.13%
4.78%

5.26%
1.2%

5.62%
0.32%

1.81%
0.2%

344

6.14

3.0

5.53%

1.68%

0.37%

0.22%

90

85.43

13

2.32%

0.7%

1.63%

0.8%

148
0

98.15
8.87

16
0

2.66%
0.80%

0.89%
0.0%

1.87%
0.38%

0.93%
0.0%

23
625

18.24
302

4
27.0

1.65%
13.14%

0.24%
6.80%

0.78%
6.49%

0.30%
2.19%

681
154

312.9
6.58

31.0
4.0

13.63%
8.56%

7.15%
2.6%

6.74%
0.66%

2.36%
0.4%

213

7.38

5.0

9.60%

3.26%

0.74%

0.46%
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250 stocks by trading volume during regular trading hours. For these actively traded
stocks, the average short selling volume is $1,477,000 and $10,256,000 during BMO and
AMC sessions on earnings announcement days, respectively. On earnings announcement
days, the average number of short trades increases to 78 and 430 during BMO and AMC
sessions, respectively. In Table 2 Panel C, we report the results for top 250 Nasdaq-listed
stocks by trading volume.
4. Methodology and Results
4.1 Do short sellers profit from after-hours short selling?
In this section, we test if short sellers make profit by short selling during BMO
and AMC sessions. We compute the return of each after-hours short sell trade (rss) using
the short sale price and the opening price as follows:

rss = (Priceshort sell- Priceopen)/Priceopen

(1)

For BMO session, Priceopen is the opening price of the same day. For AMC
session, Priceopen is the opening price of the next day. For both BMO and AMC sessions,
we compute the average return for each stock-day by weighing the return of each short
sale trade by the size of the trade. Next, we take average of return separately across all
earnings announcement days and across all non-announcement days. In Table 3 Panel A,
we report these numbers in column 4. In column 5 through column 8, we present the
median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of these returns. In column 9, we
present the % number of days when short sellers make profit. In column 10, we present
the % number of daily short sell trades that are profitable. We find that short sellers make
a return of 0.29% and 0.32% on BMO and AMC earnings announcement days
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Table 3
Returns to short sellers during BMO and AMC periods using opening price
For each stock-day during RegSHO period from January 2005 to January 2007, we compute the return of each short sell trade that
occurred during after-hours using the short sale price and the opening price as follows:
rss = (Priceshort sell- Priceopen)/Priceopen
For BMO session, priceopen is the opening price of the same day. For AMC session, priceopen is the opening price of the next day. For
both BMO and AMC sessions, we compute the average return for each stock-day by weighing the return of each short sale trade by
the size of the trade. Next, we take average of return across all earnings announcement days and across all non-announcement days.
We report these numbers in column 4 of Table 3 Panel A. In column 5 through column 8, we present the median, minimum,
maximum, and standard deviation of these returns. In column 9, we present the % number of days when short sellers make profit. In
column 10, we present the % number of daily short sell trades that are profitable. In Panel B, we report the similar analysis for top
250 stocks by volume. In Panel C, we report the similar analysis for top 250 Nasdaq stocks by volume.
N
Mean
Panel A: All stocks
BMO Announcement
2613
0.29%
Non-Announcement
190615
0.15%
AMC Announcement
6551
0.32%
Non-Announcement
1046593
0.00%
Panel B: Top 250 stocks by volume
BMO Announcement
344
0.11%
Non-Announcement
35975
0.08%
AMC Announcement
647
0.17%
Non-Announcement
106964
-0.04%
Panel C: Top 250 Nasdaq listed stocks by volume
BMO Announcement
356
0.03%
Non-Announcement
55777
0.09%
AMC Announcement
1015
0.28%
Non-Announcement
102190
-0.04%

Median Minimum

Maximu
m

0.16%
0.09%
0.00%
0.00%

-12.31%
-39.81%
-22.65%
-49.08%

0.05%
0.04%
-0.09%
0.00%
0.03%
0.06%
0.03%
0.00%
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Std Dev

% Profitable
days

% Profitable
trades

16.60%
37.46%
46.41%
49.94%

1.98%
1.20%
5.02%
1.26%

56.64%
57.50%
48.01%
47.08%

54.00%
55.23%
54.77%
46.20%

-6.68%
-19.07%
-19.41%
-22.69%

6.98%
17.05%
21.04%
47.82%

1.45%
0.68%
4.07%
1.12%

53.20%
55.56%
48.53%
46.08%

53.33%
50.32%
50.21%
47.58%

-6.68%
-19.07%
-19.41%
-36.93%

5.07%
19.05%
31.32%
49.80%

1.36%
0.75%
4.89%
1.36%

51.12%
56.90%
50.34%
48.15%

0.00%
47.82%
0.00%
47.33%

respectively. In Panel B, we report similar results for top 250 stocks by trading volume.
In Panel C, we report the results for top 250 Nasdaq-listed stocks by trading volume.
In Table 4, we present the similar analysis as Table 3, using the closing price to
compute the return for short sell trades. We find that the magnitude of these returns is
higher when compared with returns computed using opening prices. The return to short
sellers during BMO earnings announcement days increases to 1.11% and the return
during AMC earnings announcement days increases to 0.68%.
Next, we separate earnings announcement days with positive surprise and
negative surprise. If short sellers make profit on days of negative surprise, then they are
able to trade quickly and incorporate negative news in stock prices faster. In Table 5, we
report trading profit of short sellers on earnings announcement days of positive and
negative surprise. In Panel A, we report the results separately for BMO and AMC
sessions for all stocks. In column 4 to 8, we present the mean, median, minimum,
maximum, and standard deviation of these returns. In column 9, we present the %
number of days when short sellers make profit. In column 10, we present the % number
of daily short sell trades that are profitable. We find that short sellers make a return of
0.46% and 2.03% for negative surprise announcements during BMO and AMC sessions,
respectively. In contrast, the return during days of positive surprise is 0.19% and -0.43%
during BMO and AMC sessions, respectively. Thus, short sellers make higher returns
when there is a negative surprise in earnings announcement. Short sellers make a positive
return on 64.3% of AMC earnings announcement days with negative surprise. On
average, 62.2% of the trades are profitable on AMC earnings announcement days with
negative surprise. In Panel B, we report similar results for top 250 stocks by trading
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Table 4
Returns to short sellers during BMO and AMC periods using closing price
For each stock-day during RegSHO period from January 2005 to January 2007, we compute the return of each short sell trade that
occurred during after-hours using the short sale price and the closing price as follows:
rss = (Priceshort sell- Priceclose)/Priceclose
For BMO session, priceclose is the closing price of the same day. For AMC session, priceclose is the closing price of the next day. For
both BMO and AMC sessions, we compute the average return for each stock-day by weighing the return of each short sale trade by
the size of the trade. Next, we take average of return across all earnings announcement days and across all non-announcement days.
We report these numbers in column 4 of Table 3 Panel A. In column 5 through column 8, we present the median, minimum,
maximum, and standard deviation of these returns. In column 9, we present the % number of days when short sellers make profit. In
column 10, we present the % number of daily short sell trades that are profitable. In Panel B, we report the similar analysis for top
250 stocks by volume. In Panel C, we report the similar analysis for top 250 Nasdaq stocks by volume.
% Profitable % Profitable
days
trades
N
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Dev
Panel A: All stocks
BMO Announcement
2613
1.11%
0.53%
-23.18%
44.30%
6.11%
55.64%
55.39%
Non-Announcement
190615
0.26%
0.14%
-47.15%
49.61%
3.06%
52.90%
52.59%
AMC Announcement
6551
0.68%
0.14%
-28.30%
46.08%
7.71%
51.27%
47.71%
Non-Announcement
1046593
0.05%
0.02%
-49.74%
49.82%
2.44%
50.38%
50.21%
Panel B: Top 250 stocks by volume
BMO Announcement
344
0.75%
0.82%
-23.18%
19.96%
4.26%
58.72%
53.44%
Non-Announcement
35975
0.23%
0.19%
-24.15%
30.89%
2.34%
54.24%
43.37%
AMC Announcement
647
0.89%
0.31%
-19.63%
35.19%
6.48%
52.86%
58.52%
Non-Announcement
106964
0.02%
0.02%
-41.23%
49.11%
2.20%
50.36%
53.10%
Panel C: Top 250 Nasdaq listed stocks by volume
BMO Announcement
356
0.42%
0.25%
-23.18%
30.60%
5.36%
53.37%
0.00%
Non-Announcement
55777
0.23%
0.18%
-36.99%
49.39%
2.60%
53.88%
51.84%
AMC Announcement
1015
0.85%
0.41%
-19.63%
36.78%
7.84%
52.61%
0.00%
Non-Announcement
102190
0.07%
0.07%
-41.23%
49.60%
2.68%
51.38%
52.78%
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Table 5
Opening returns to short sellers by earnings surprise
For each stock-day during RegSHO period from January 2005 to January 2007, we compute the return of each short sell trade that
occurred during after-hours using the short sale price and the opening price as follows:
rss = (Priceshort sell- Priceopen)/Priceopen
For BMO session, priceopen is the opening price of the same day. For AMC session, priceopen is the opening price of the next day. For
both BMO and AMC sessions, we compute the average return for each stock-day by weighing the return of each short sale trade by
the size of the trade. We take average of return across all earnings announcement days with negative surprise and across all earnings
announcement days with positive surprise. We report these numbers in column 4 of Table 3 Panel A. In column 5 to 8, we present
the median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of these returns. In column 9, we present the % number of days when short
sellers make profit. In column 10, we present the % number of daily short sell trades that are profitable. In Panel B, we report the
similar analysis for top 250 stocks by volume. In Panel C, we report the similar analysis for top 250 Nasdaq stocks by volume.
Std
% Profitable
% Profitable
N
Mean
Median Minimum Maximum
Dev
days
trades
Panel A: All stocks
BMO
Negative surprise
997
0.46%
0.21%
-12.31%
16.60%
2.29%
58.4%
55.31%
Positive surprise
1616
0.19%
0.13%
-10.05%
10.90%
1.76%
55.6%
53.19%
AMC
Negative surprise
1988
2.03%
0.89%
-18.47%
46.41%
5.43%
64.3%
62.32%
Positive surprise
4563
-0.43% -0.42%
-22.65%
44.12%
4.64%
40.9%
40.36%
Panel B: Top 250 stocks by volume
BMO
Negative surprise
106
-0.01% 0.02%
-6.68%
6.98%
1.71%
50.0%
44.75%
Positive surprise
238
0.17%
0.07%
-5.57%
4.95%
1.32%
54.6%
52.64%
AMC
Negative surprise
129
2.15%
1.64%
-5.55%
21.04%
3.95%
72.1%
65.79%
Positive surprise
518
-0.33% -0.51%
-19.41%
19.29%
3.95%
42.7%
43.04%
Panel C: Top 250 Nasdaq listed stocks by volume
BMO
Negative surprise
123
0.03%
0.02%
-6.68%
4.16%
1.47%
51.2%
44.81%
Positive surprise
233
0.02%
0.03%
-5.57%
5.07%
1.30%
51.1%
49.42%
AMC
Negative surprise
222
2.34%
1.57%
-11.29%
31.32%
5.17%
67.6%
63.75%
Positive surprise
793
-0.29% -0.44%
-19.41%
26.64%
4.65%
45.5%
44.18%
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volume. In Panel C, we report the results for top 250 Nasdaq-listed stocks by trading
volume.
In Table 6, we present the similar analysis as Table 5, using the closing price to
compute the return for short sell trades. Again, we find that the magnitude of these
returns to is higher when compared with returns computed using opening prices. On
earnings announcement days with negative surprise, the return to short sellers during
BMO session increases to 1.69% and the return during AMC session increases to 2.92%.
Next, we use return to short sellers as the dependent variable. We estimate the
following OLS regression:

Return to short sellers (rss) = α + β1 Surprise + β2 Negative Surprise + β3 AMC
+β4 Short volume + β5 Negative surprise * AMC * Short volume + β6 Firm size
(2)

+ε

where Surprise is the difference of actual earnings and median analysts forecast
for each quarter of each stock normalized by the stock price. Negative surprise is a
dummy variable that takes a value for negative surprise stock-days, and 0 otherwise.
AMC is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for AMC earnings announcement days
and, 0 otherwise. Short volume is the short selling volume during AMC/BMO period.
Firm size is the log of market capitalization of each firm.
Our regression results are reported in Table 7. We report four alternative
specifications. We find that Negative surprise is positive and significant across all models.
Short sellers make more profits on earnings announcement days with negative surprise.
The coefficient for Negative surprise * AMC * short volume is positive in model 4 and
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Table 6
Closing returns to short sellers by earnings surprise
For each stock-day during RegSHO period from January 2005 to January 2007, we compute the return of each short sell trade that
occurred during after-hours using the short sale price and the closing price as follows:
rss = (Priceshort sell- Priceclose)/Priceclose
For BMO session, priceclose is the closing price of the same day. For AMC session, priceclose is the closing price of the next day. For
both BMO and AMC sessions, we compute the average return for each stock-day by weighing the return of each short sale trade by
the size of the trade. Next, we take average of return across all earnings announcement days with negative surprise and across all
earnings announcement days with positive surprise. We report these numbers in column 4 of Table 3 Panel A. In column 5 through
column 8, we present the median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of these returns. In column 9, we present the %
number of days when short sellers make profit. In column 10, we present the % number of daily short sell trades that are profitable.
In Panel B, we report the similar analysis for top 250 stocks by volume. In Panel C, we report the similar analysis for top 250 Nasdaq
stocks by volume.
% Profitable
% Profitable
N
Mean
Median
Minimum Maximum Std Dev
days
days
Panel A: All stocks
BMO
Negative surprise
997
1.69%
0.89%
-23.18%
44.30%
6.99%
58.3%
58.27%
Positive surprise
1616
0.75%
0.30%
-19.91%
37.49%
5.46%
54.0%
53.61%
AMC
Negative surprise
1988
2.92%
1.75%
-23.64%
46.08%
8.02%
64.7%
63.77%
Positive surprise
4563
-0.30%
-0.56%
-28.30%
45.46%
7.36%
45.4%
45.36%
Panel B: Top 250 stocks by volume
BMO
Negative surprise
106
0.52%
0.86%
-23.18%
11.79%
4.97%
57.5%
58.70%
Positive surprise
238
0.86%
0.80%
-10.90%
19.96%
3.91%
59.2%
58.44%
AMC
Negative surprise
129
3.57%
2.47%
-19.53%
35.19%
7.85%
67.4%
67.89%
Positive surprise
518
0.22%
-0.04%
-19.63%
24.65%
5.92%
49.2%
49.43%
Panel C: Top 250 Nasdaq listed stocks by volume
BMO
Negative surprise
123
0.57%
0.74%
-23.18%
30.60%
5.83%
55.3%
56.14%
Positive surprise
233
0.34%
0.15%
-10.90%
21.22%
5.11%
52.4%
49.57%
AMC
Negative surprise
222
3.57%
2.49%
-19.53%
36.78%
8.81%
63.5%
63.87%
Positive surprise
793
0.09%
-0.06%
-19.63%
30.50%
7.38%
49.6%
49.49%
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model 5. Thus, higher short selling volume for AMC earnings announcement with
negative surprise results in higher returns to short sellers. In model 5, the coefficient for
Firm size is negative and significant. Short sellers make lower returns by short selling
larger firms.

Table 7
Return regression
In this table, return for each after-hour short sell trade is computed using:
rss = (Priceshort sell- Priceopen)/Priceopen
For both BMO and AMC sessions, we compute the average return for each stock-day by
weighing the return of each short sale trade by the size of the trade. Next, we take
average of return across all earnings announcement days and use it as a dependent
variable in the following regression:
Return to short sellers (rss) = α + β1 Surprise + β2 Negative Surprise + β3 AMC
+β4 Short volume + β5 Negative surprise * AMC * Short volume + β6 Firm size +ε
Surprise is the difference of actual earnings and median analysts forecast for each
quarter of each stock normalized by the stock price. Negative surprise is a dummy
variable that takes a value for negative surprise stock-days, and 0 otherwise. AMC is a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for AMC announcements and, 0 otherwise. Short
volume is the short selling volume during AMC/BMO period. Firm size is the log of
market capitalization of each firm.
Dependent variable
Return to after-hours short selling
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Intercept
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Surprise
-0.0024
-0.0010
-0.0011
-0.0011
Negative surprise
0.1902*** 0.1915*** 0.1894*** 0.1864***
AMC
0.0172*
0.0167
0.0152
BMO/AMC short
volume
-0.0008
-0.0082
-0.0035
Negative surprise *
AMC * short volume
0.0213*
0.0220**
Firm size
-0.0193*
Adjusted R Square
0.0001
0.0361
0.0365
Number of
observations
9,161
9,161
9,161
*** and * represent significance at 1% and 10% respectively.
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0.0364

0.0364

9,161

9,161

4.2 Price efficiency of opening price
Barclay and Hendershott (2008) find that as Nasdaq pre-open trading volume
increased, the opening price became more efficient and price discovery shifted from the
opening trade to the pre-open. Price discovery shifted from the trading day to the preopen only for the highest-volume stocks. Their results suggest that preopen trading
contributes to the efficiency of the opening price, but that a critical threshold of trading
volume is required to increase the amount of information in the opening price. We want
to study the importance of after-hours short selling in contributing to an efficient opening
price. To quantify price discovery during after-hours, we compute the weighted price
contribution (WPC) of close to open period on earnings announcement days as:
 = ∑ 

|

∑|

|



|

,




(2)

where retco,s for BMO is based on closing price of the previous day and opening
price of the earnings announcement day. retco,s for AMC is based on closing price of the
earnings announcement day and opening price of the next day. rets for BMO (AMC) is
based on closing price of the previous day (earnings announcement day) and closing
price of the earnings announcement day (next day). We calculate WPCco separately for
days with short selling activity and days without short selling activity for both BMO and
AMC sessions. We report these results in Table 8. In Table 8 Panel A, we find that the
WPCco measure for BMO announcements on days with short selling is 0.53, which is
significantly higher than the WPCco measure for BMO announcements on days with no
short selling. We find similar results for AMC announcements. The WPCco measure on
days with short selling is 0.57, which is significantly higher than the WPCco measure on
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days with no short selling. In Table 8 Panel B, we present these results for top 250 stocks
by trading volume. In Table 8 Panel C, we present these results for top 250 Nasdaq stocks
by trading volume.

Table 8
Weighted price contribution with and without after hours short selling
We compute the WPC for close-to-open period as:
|
|
,
 = ∑  ∑ |  |







where retco,s for BMO is based on closing price of the previous day and opening price of
the announcement day. retco,s for AMC is based on closing price of the announcement
day and opening price of the next day. rets for BMO (AMC) is based on closing price of
the previous day (announcement day) and closing price of the announcement day (next
day). We calculate WPCco separately for days with short selling activity and days without
short selling activity for both BMO and AMC sessions.
No short selling
Panel A: All listed stocks
The BMO Sub-sample
The AMC Sub-sample
Panel B: Top 250 stocks by volume
The BMO Sub-sample

Short selling Difference

0.41

0.53

0.12

0.41

0.57

0.16

0.42

0.54

0.11

The AMC Sub-sample
Panel C: Top 250 stocks by volume
The BMO Sub-sample

0.55

0.69

0.14

0.09

0.52

0.43

The AMC Sub-sample

0.27

0.64

0.38

Next in Table 9, we divide BMO (AMC) earnings announcement days with short
selling in quintiles using BMO (AMC) short selling volume. For our analysis, we
calculate WPCco by taking average across each quintile. We find that the WPCco increases
monotonously with increases in BMO short selling volume. Next, we find that the

122

quintile with highest BMO short selling volume have a WPCco measure of 0.73, which is
significantly higher than WPCco measure of 0.35 for the quintile with lowest BMO short
selling volume. We find similar results for AMC announcements. There is a monotonous
increase in WPCco measure with increase in AMC short selling volume. The WPCco
measure for the highest AMC short selling quintile is 0.69, which is significantly higher
than WPCco measure of 0.48 for the quintile with lowest AMC short selling volume.
Table 9
Weighted price contribution by BMO/AMC short selling volume quintiles on
announcement days
We compute the WPC for close-to-open period as:
 = ∑ 
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where retco,s for BMO is based on closing price of the previous day and opening price of
the announcement day. retco,s for AMC is based on closing price of the announcement
day and opening price of the next day. rets for BMO (AMC) is based on closing price of
the previous day (announcement day) and closing price of the announcement day (next
day). We divide BMO (AMC) earnings announcement days with short selling in quintiles
using AMC short selling volume. For our analysis, we calculate WPCco by taking average
across each quintile.
BMO/AMC short selling volume quintile
Highest
Lowest
2
3
4
Overall
Panel A: All listed stocks
The BMO sub-sample

0.35

0.39

0.53

0.58

0.73

0.54

0.50

0.53

0.60

0.69

0.51

0.41

0.34

0.56

0.79

0.54

The AMC sub-sample
0.61
0.57 0.67
Panel C: Top 250 Nasdaq listed stocks by volume
The BMO sub-sample
0.27
0.42 0.46

0.77

0.81

0.68

0.54

0.74

0.63

The AMC sub-sample

0.76

0.77

0.62

The AMC sub-sample
0.48
Panel B: Top 250 stocks by volume
The BMO sub-sample
0.48

0.48

0.59
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0.60

Next, we use WPCco as the dependent variable. We estimate the following OLS
regression:
WPCco = α + β1 BMO/AMC short selling volume + β2 Surprise
+ β3 Negative surprise + β4 Firm size + β5 Analyst + ε

(3)

where Analyst is the number of analysts following a stock reported in I/B/E/S
details files for each quarter. Other variables have been defined previously.

Table 10
Weighted price contribution regression
We compute the WPC for close-to-open period as:
 = 

| |
,
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We estimate the following OLS regression:
WPCco = α + β1 BMO/AMC short selling volume + β2 Surprise
+ β3 Negative surprise + β4 Firm size + β5 Analyst + ε
where Analyst is the number of analysts following a stock reported in I/B/E/S details files
for each quarter. Rest of the variables have been defined previously.
Dependent variable: Weighted price contribution
BMO Announcements
AMC Announcements
Model 1 Model 2
Model 3
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
BMO/AMC
short volume
0.0522* 0.0523*
0.0606*
0.0527* 0.0529* 0.0597*
Surprise
-0.0048
-0.0057
-0.0061 -0.0066
Negative
surprise
0.0072
-0.0050
0.0037
-0.0028
Firm size
-0.0739*
-0.0370*
Analyst
0.0002
0.0151
Adjusted R
Square
0.0026
0.0025
Number of
observations
8,908
8,899
* represent significance at 1%.

0.0075

0.0027

0.0025

0.0033

8,899

9,102

9,093

9,093
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Our regression results are reported in Table 10. We run separate regressions for
BMO and AMC earnings announcements. We report three alternative specifications for
BMO and AMC earnings announcements. BMO/AMC short selling volume is positive
and significant across all specifications. A higher short selling volume increases the WPC
during close to open period. Firm size has a significant negative impact on WPC. Other
variables are insignificant across all models.
5. Conclusion
We document evidence of significant short selling activity during AHT on
earnings announcement days. On announcement days with short selling activity during
AHT, short selling accounts for $513,000 and $1,380,000 of trading volume during BMO
and AMC sessions, respectively. For actively traded stocks, these numbers increase to
$1,477,000 and $10,256,000 for BMO and AMC sessions, respectively. For these active
stocks, the average number of short sell trades is 78 and 430 on earnings announcement
days during BMO and AMC sessions, respectively.
We provide evidence on profitability of short trades during AHT. We find that on
announcement days with negative surprise, short sellers make a profit of 0.46% and 2.03%
during BMO and AMC sessions respectively. For AMC announcements, the magnitude of
these profits increase with increase in short selling volume. In contrast, for AMC earnings
announcements with positive surprise, short sellers make a loss of 0.43%.
We also find evidence that short selling contributes to more efficient opening
prices. We divide BMO (AMC) earnings announcement days between days with no BMO
(AMC) short selling and days with BMO (AMC) short selling. We find that opening
prices are more efficient when there is short selling during AHT. We also find that for
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earnings announcement days with short selling, the opening prices become more efficient
with the increase in short selling volume.
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